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Rethinking Transparency in U.S. Elections 
REBECCA GREEN* 
Bush v. Gore catapulted this country into a crisis of confidence in the 
management of our elections. Despite reforms since 2000, public confidence in 
election administration continues to wane. Are dead people on the rolls? Are 
noncitizens voting? Are provisional ballots wrongly rejected? State election 
transparency statutes meant to reassure the public that elections are producing 
legitimate results are often conflicting, vague, and even nonexistent. 
Exacerbating the problem, the last two decades have witnessed huge changes 
that offset the transparency balance. Dramatic changes in how Americans 
vote, how elections are administered, and who scrutinizes the election process 
call for a recalibration of election transparency norms. It is not immediately 
clear, as some are beginning to sense, that unqualified openness serves the 
fundamental goals of election transparency, that reactive access policies boost 
public confidence, or that current state transparency architectures tap the full 
potential technology offers. Circumstances demand not just statutory revision, 
but revisiting traditional assumptions about election transparency to 
accommodate radically changed circumstances. This paper contains a 
proposal pairing an increase in public access to election materials with 
penalties for harmful uses of election data. We have an opportunity to craft a 
modern transparency regime trained on the core goal of ensuring public 
confidence in election outcomes. Developing state transparency regimes that 
address—and take advantage of—modern realities is critical in an era when 
election controversy is the new normal.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the initial tally in Virginia’s 2013 election for attorney general, 
Republican Mark D. Obenshain trailed Democrat Mark R. Herring by seventeen 
votes out of 2.2 million cast—one of the closest statewide races in U.S. history. 
During the canvas, representatives of the Herring campaign huddled at the 
Fairfax County Clerk’s office taking pictures of lists of provisional voters with 
their cell phones. The clerk, unsure of whether such lists could be made public 
and if so to whom and in what form, looked nervously on. The campaign 
wanted to record which voters had cast provisional ballots to help ensure 
Herring provisional votes counted. But, as in many states, Virginia’s state and 
local rules are silent on whether the names of provisional voters may be 
released.1 The answer mattered: the outcome of the race could well have hinged 
on provisional votes. And the race mattered. After his win (by 810 votes at the 
time Obenshain conceded), Herring refused to defend the state’s same-sex 
marriage ban, surely contributing to a federal judge’s decision to overturn it just 
weeks after Herring took office.2 
This example is one of many recent incidents that expose an election 
transparency regime terribly out of date. Transparency in elections is a key 
pillar of a functioning democracy.3 Since the founding of this country, those 
who run elections have understood that democratic legitimacy depends on 
                                                                                                                       
 1  VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-653 (2014) (permitting “[o]ne authorized representative of 
each political party or independent candidate in a general or special election or one 
authorized representative of each candidate in a primary election . . . to remain in the room 
in which the determination [of the eligibility of a provisional voter] is being made as an 
observer so long as he does not participate in the proceedings and does not impede the 
orderly conduct of the determination. Each authorized representative shall be a qualified 
voter of any jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. Each representative, who is not himself a 
candidate or party chairman, shall present to the electoral board a written statement 
designating him to be a representative of the party or candidate and signed by the county or 
city chairman of his political party, the independent candidate, or the primary candidate, as 
appropriate.”). Later, the Chief Judge for the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond 
instructed in his December 10, 2013 Recount Procedural Order that representatives of the 
candidates be given access to records regarding decisions on the eligibility of provisional 
voters but prohibited public dissemination of this information. Recount Procedural Order at 
1–3, Obenshain v. Herring, No. CL13-5272 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/releases/recountproceduralorder.pdf. 
 2  See Markus Schmidt, Ruling Sparks Renewed Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Feb. 14, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/virginia-politics/ruling-sparks-renewed-
debate-over-same-sex-marriage/article_15548c64-0f56-5a22-b2f0-37510816c1c0.html,  
archived at http://perma.cc/U2J8-7ZKG. 
 3  RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS ix (2012) (“A lack of faith in elections 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that undermines faith in democratic governance itself.”). 
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public confidence in the conduct of elections.4 Today, from federal transparency 
requirements for voter registration forms,5 to poll watcher and recount observer 
statutes,6 to voting machine audit requirements,7 our system routinely 
acknowledges transparency as a core value in ensuring the legitimacy of 
electoral outcomes.8 But history demonstrates transparency must be carefully 
calibrated; greater transparency does not always lead to greater legitimacy. The 
most obvious example is the shift to secret ballot in the late nineteenth century, 
a form of voting adopted to restore public confidence in elections after decades 
of debauchery at the polls. History teaches that too much transparency in the 
voting process carries risk and undermines the legitimacy of outcomes.9  
Our democracy has walked the transparency tightrope for hundreds of 
years. In the last two decades, however, several currents dramatically offset the 
balance. First, we are witnessing enormous changes in voting. Today, fewer and 
fewer Americans cast traditional ballots due in part to significant increases in 
early, mail-in, and provisional voting. Second, new technologies have 
transformed how states interface with the public, how voters cast ballots, and 
how election officials collect, store, and disseminate election data. The 
digitization of elections fundamentally changes the election transparency 
landscape. And third, since Bush v. Gore, the days when political party and 
candidate representatives served as the principal watchdogs of elections are 
                                                                                                                       
 4  Cortlandt F. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies, in 3 STUDIES IN 
HISTORY ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 1, 186 (New York, Columbia College 1893) 
(explaining as a transparency measure, many colonies and towns would offer a copy of the 
polls to anyone who would pay for them so they could look through and check votes); see 
infra Part II. 
 5  42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1)–(2) (2012) (requiring that each state maintain for two 
years, and make available for public inspection at reasonable cost, voter registration 
records).  
 6  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §101.131 (West 2014) (allowing each political party, 
candidate, or ballot measure advocate one poll watcher at the polls); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3501.35, 3505.21 (West 2012) (permitting watchers to include those selected by political 
parties, those selected by candidates themselves, watchers selected by the state, and 
requiring watchers to take an oath); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604 (2014) (watchers can 
include those selected by political parties, those selected by candidates themselves, or 
selected by the state; watchers must be registered voters in the county; provisions for news 
media observation). 
 7  See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic 
Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1722 (2005) (discussing problems associated with 
assuring an accurate count with new voting technology). 
 8  Note that this paper narrows its scope to election administration transparency only. 
Campaign finance transparency falls outside its scope.  
 9  R. Michael Alvarez et al., Are Americans Confident Their Ballots are Counted?, 70 
J. POL. 754, 764 (2008) (finding a relationship between voter familiarity with voting 
technology and confidence in the electoral process); Raymond J. La Raja, Political 
Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency on Making Small 
Campaign Contributions, POL. BEHAV. (Oct. 29, 2013), available at 
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/.  
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fading quickly.10 Election integrity advocates, voting rights activists, and 
members of both the citizen media and traditional media scrutinize election 
materials at levels and in ways not previously possible.11  
Amidst this series of cultural and technological changes, state election 
transparency statutes offer confused guidance; transparency statutes are often 
dated, inconsistent, underinclusive, and even absent. Circumstances demand not 
just statutory revision, but revisiting traditional assumptions about election 
transparency to accommodate radically changed circumstances. It is not 
immediately clear, as some scholars are beginning to sense, 12 that total and 
unqualified openness serves the fundamental goals of election transparency, that 
reactive access policies boost public confidence, or that current policies tap the 
full potential of election data. Policymakers have an opportunity to craft a 
modern transparency regime trained on the core goal of ensuring public 
confidence in election outcomes. Developing state transparency regimes that 
address modern realities is critical, particularly in an era when election 
controversy has begun to feel like the new normal.13 
Election transparency is a broad topic. Much has been written about it, 
particularly in the area of campaign finance and the extent to which political 
spending should be made public.14 Some scholars have tackled the question of 
transparency in election administration with the bulk of the work focused on 
improving election administration through better recordkeeping and 
performance data creation and analysis.15 Quite a lot has also been written about 
transparency in the age of electronic voting and the auditability of voting 
machines.16 Virtually all of the work done to date on election-administration 
                                                                                                                       
 10  See Gilda R. Daniels, Outsourcing Democracy: Redefining Public-Private 
Partnerships in Election Administration, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 237, 238 (2010) (noting the 
rise of private election watchdog groups since 2000). 
 11  Following the 2013 Supreme Court’s decision to strike the coverage formula 
undergirding Voting Rights Act preclearance provisions, citizen oversight efforts are likely 
to ramp up. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013); see Cody Gray, Savior 
Through Severance: A Litigation-Based Response to Shelby County v. Holder, 50 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (arguing for expanded federal observation under the 
Voting Rights Act). 
 12  See, e.g., E. Scott Adler & Thad E. Hall, Ballots, Transparency, and Democracy, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 146, 147 (2013) (arguing against public access to voted ballots). 
 13  Election litigation in this country has more than doubled since Bush v. Gore in 2000. 
See HASEN, supra note 3, at 134.  
 14  E.g., Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After 
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 987 (2011); Michael 
D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
1847, 1849 (2013); Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 559 (2012). 
 15  E.g., R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, LONNA RAE ATKESON & THAD E. HALL, EVALUATING 
ELECTIONS 12–14 (2013); HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 5–6 (2009). 
 16  E.g., Tokaji, supra note 7, at 1722; R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, IBM 
CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, THE NEXT BIG ELECTION CHALLENGE: DEVELOPING 
ELECTRONIC DATA TRANSACTION STANDARDS FOR ELECTION ADMINISTRATION (2005). 
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transparency assumes that transparency is an unqualified good; the more 
transparency in our elections the better. This Article will step back to test basic 
truths about transparency in elections and demonstrate the need to adapt rules to 
changed circumstances. It asks, given modern realities, whether states should 
constrict election transparency or whether access should be broadened, and, if 
so, how and with what accompanying protections.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. The first establishes the central goal of 
election transparency and how election administrators have adapted processes 
throughout American history in pursuit of it. The next section documents three 
fundamental shifts and the failure of current transparency policies to adequately 
address them. The final section proposes election transparency reform to ensure 
that dated transparency rules do not undermine already-fragile public faith in 
our system of elections.  
II. ELECTION TRANSPARENCY AND ADAPTATION 
Transparency in elections is different than transparency in other 
administrative settings. Just as the right to vote is hailed as preservative of all 
other rights, 17 so too is election transparency preservative of all other forms of 
government transparency. Without the public confidence in election outcomes 
transparency enables, no legitimate government could form. 
It is true that election transparency serves goals similar to transparency in 
other administrative settings: promoting accountability, enabling an informed 
citizenry, protecting citizens against arbitrary and capricious state action, and 
exposing mistake or fraud.18 Election transparency can also increase efficiency 
in election administration.19 But administrative transparency in elections serves 
an additional—and critical—function that sets it apart from administrative 
transparency in other realms. Like courts, for which transparency’s key goal is 
to enhance the public’s perception of just legal outcomes,20 a critical function of 
                                                                                                                       
 17  Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (“Long ago in Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, the Court referred to ‘the political franchise of voting’ as a 
‘fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.’”). 
 18  Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006) (“By 
any commonsense estimation, governmental transparency, defined broadly as a governing 
institution’s openness to the gaze of others, is clearly among the pantheon of great political 
virtues.”). Two of the most commonly cited goals of government transparency in liberal 
democratic theory are to enable both an informed citizenry and official accountability, 
central ingredients of the democratic project. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, An Essay on 
Political Tactics, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 551 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, 
William Tait 1843); JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 80–89 (Henry Regnery Co. 1962) (1861). 
 19  Professor Heather Gerken makes the convincing argument, discussed infra at Part 
IV.B, that the more data we have about election administration, the easier it will be to 
identify problems and solutions. GERKEN, supra note 15, at 59–61. 
 20  Though not acknowledged as a First Amendment right until Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the American judicial system and its British precursor 
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administrative transparency in elections is ensuring public confidence in 
electoral outcomes. For elections to achieve their intended purpose, the peaceful 
transfer of power, the public must believe that outcomes reflect the true will of 
the people. Without this perception, legitimate government cannot function and 
all other forms of government transparency are for naught. Administrative 
transparency in elections is thus a precondition for all other forms of 
government transparency.  
Recognizing that the fundamental goal of transparency in elections is 
ensuring public confidence in outcomes, election administrators since the 
founding of this country have understood that more transparency does not 
necessarily equal a better process. Election designers have calibrated the extent 
to which the public could see for itself various portions of the election process 
depending upon a variety of historical, demographic, and technological 
conditions underpinning the conduct of elections.21 Election administrators 
intuitively understood that election processes could not be conducted entirely in 
the dark without some measure of public oversight.22 Likewise, election 
designers also recognized that too much transparency might undermine the 
result. 
Perhaps the best example of election-legitimizing transparency measures in 
early U.S. elections was the common practice of casting votes by speaking the 
name of the preferred candidate out loud, a process known as viva voce voting. 
After voicing one’s vote, custom had it that the candidate would bow and thank 
the voter as partisan onlookers applauded.23 In jurisdictions using paper 
                                                                                                                       
has long recognized the value of open courts in assuring just outcomes and public 
acceptance of judicial verdicts. Id. at 566 (“[T]he King's will was that all evil doers should 
be punished after their deserts, and that justice should be ministered indifferently to rich as 
to poor; and for the better accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the county by 
their attendance there to lend him their aid in the establishing of a happy and certain peace 
that should be both for the honour of the realm and for their own welfare.”) (citations 
omitted)). 
 21  See generally Adler & Hall, supra note 12. 
 22  Early examples include the New Hampshire constitution of 1792 which required that 
a moderator receive votes in an open town meeting who would then, “count them and make 
a public declaration thereof” and the Massachusetts constitution which required that, 
“persons qualified to vote shall give in their votes for Governor to the Selectmen, who shall 
preside at such meetings; and the town-clerk, in the presence and with the assistance of the 
Selectmen shall, in open town meeting, sort and count the votes, and form a list of the 
persons voted for, with the number of votes for each person, against his name; and shall 
make a fair record of the same in the town books.” In Virginia, a 1785 statute dictated that 
each “writer” at the polls would be given a poll book with the name of each candidate at the 
head of a column. “As each elector named his preferred candidate his name was written in 
the column of that candidate,” thereby creating a written, transparent record of who voted for 
whom. SPENCER D. ALBRIGHT, THE AMERICAN BALLOT 18 (1942). 
 23  Virginia and Kentucky employed viva voce voting through the Civil War. James 
Schouler, Evolution of the American Voter, in 2 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 665, 
671 (George B. Adams et al. eds., 1897) (“[I]n the appeal to unflinching manliness at the 
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ballots,24 balloting practices—such as brightly colored ballots—commonly 
connected a voter to his choice.25 Voting through much of the nineteenth 
century, whether through voice voting or paper balloting, was a very public 
act.26 Most scholarly references to open balloting discuss its purpose of 
securing voter accountability.27 A less examined feature of voice voting and 
other forms of open balloting was its instrumental function as a primitive 
election transparency tool, allowing onlookers to literally tally for themselves 
who won and who lost.28  
Given the small population and even smaller pool of eligible voters in early 
U.S. elections (only propertied males held the franchise),29 open voting served 
transparency’s legitimizing purpose well. But as the franchise expanded, 
especially after the Civil War,30 elections became increasingly complex and 
difficult to administer. Transient and illiterate populations and large urban 
immigrant communities made the process of determining voter eligibility 
                                                                                                                       
polls these two states insisted still that every voter should show at the hustings the courage 
of his personal conviction.”). 
 24  According to one historian, paper ballots were first used in Colonial America by the 
congregation of the Salem church for choosing its minister in 1629. ALBRIGHT, supra note 
22, at 14. 
 25  The practice of political parties distributing brightly colored ballots is the most 
obvious example of paper ballots connecting the voter to his choice. See ALBRIGHT, supra 
note 22, at 20 (“[P]arty leaders began to print the tickets [ballots] on colored paper so that 
they could be recognized some distance from the polling place. Thus there could be no 
secrecy.”). The idea that the state should print and distribute ballots is first evidenced in 
California and Louisiana in the 1870s, but was not widely adopted until much later. Id.  
 26  MARK LAWRENCE KORNBLUH, WHY AMERICA STOPPED VOTING: THE DECLINE OF 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS 126 
(2000) (“During the late nineteenth century, when people cast flamboyant, party-printed 
tickets, voting was an open act in which an individual’s partisan preference was visible to 
the entire community.”). 
 27  John Crowley, Uses and Abuses of the Secret Ballot in the American Age of Reform, 
in THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE SECRET BALLOT 45, 51 (Romain Bertrand et al. eds., 2006) 
(“[A]s Habermas has stressed, early bourgeois liberalism took it for granted that ‘publicity’ 
was the only secure basis of political virtue.”); see also Schouler, supra note 23, at 671 
(suggesting that use of the secret ballot was “un-manly”). 
 28  For those who demanded less ephemeral records, Colonial Rhode Island, New York, 
and New Jersey adopted the English rule allowing copies of the polls indicating voter 
choices to be delivered on demand to anyone willing to pay reasonable fees for copying 
them. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 225 (2010) (citing Bishop, supra note 4, at 186 ). 
 29  ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (rev. ed. 2009) (“On the eve of the American 
Revolution, in seven colonies men had to own land of specified acreage or monetary value in 
order to participate in elections; elsewhere, the ownership of personal property of a 
designated value (or in South Carolina, the payment of taxes) could substitute for real 
estate.”). 
 30  PAUL KLEPPNER, WHO VOTED? 33 (1982) (“The post-1876 phase witnessed as full a 
mobilization of the mass electorate as this country has ever experienced. Better than three-
quarters of the national electorate voted in presidential years. . . . ”). 
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difficult.31 States relied heavily on powerful political parties to do much of the 
work of administering elections—a task parties were only too happy to 
undertake. Nineteenth-century American elections were run largely out of 
government hands. Parties printed and distributed ballots,32 brought (their) 
voters to polling places, and oversaw vote tabulation.33 Polling locations were 
commonly housed in non-state-owned establishments such as private homes, 
hotels, saloons, and stores.34 Nineteenth-century election officials were not paid 
state employees but political party representatives or appointees. In many cases, 
a township’s majority party would stack the polls with election judges from its 
own ranks.35  
Increasingly, as the electorate expanded and political parties grew in 
entrenchment and hubris, American elections began to spin out of control.36 
Transparency measures originally intended to instill public confidence in 
election results instead rendered the opposite effect. Historians describing this 
era report widespread problems at the polls. Public drunkenness at polling 
places, voter intimidation, and violence diminish the democratic process.37 
                                                                                                                       
 31  RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 17–18 (2004) (noting the difficulties of confirming voter eligibility: “[M]uch of 
the United States during the nineteenth century was a preliterate society; until the turn of the 
century, in fact, there were many counties in which a quarter or more of adult white men 
could not read or write. This meant that voters were unable to keep records of when they 
were born or how long they had resided in a town or neighborhood. Since government 
agencies seldom kept records of these things, there were no certificates that could be 
presented to election officials. . . . This was less true of citizenship, where the federal 
government provided naturalization papers when immigrants became American citizens. 
However, since native-born citizens were not given such certificates, election officials had to 
know when and whom to ask for papers.”). 
 32  Ballots were commonly printed on brightly colored paper, which served to confirm 
which party slate the voter had selected. As one historian noted of the practice of parties 
printing ballots on colored paper, “[s]ecrecy, quite obviously, was not a characteristic of the 
voting process.” RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE HISTORY OF VOTING IN NEW JERSEY: A 
STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION MACHINERY 1664–1911, at 114 (1953). 
 33  One historian describes the problem of the practice of town meeting selection of 
election officials in the late 1700s in New Jersey, which often resulted in election officials 
from the same political party overseeing elections. Id. at 97. 
 34  See BENSEL, supra note 31, at 10 (listing polling places in Saint Louis in 1859 as a 
representative example of the non-state-owned polling sites). 
 35  There are several accounts of election judges being selected from opposing parties. 
Id. at 18. In other cases, election judges were voted in on the day of the election by “those 
men who happened to be present.” Id. at 37. Bensel notes that the selection of election 
judges was often a complex matter, “reflecting a mixture of community norms, notions of 
fair play between the party organizations, and the formal provisions set down in the statutory 
code. Id.  
 36  See MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 114. 
 37  Id. at 151–52 (“Scenes of drunkenness at the polls had become traditional. Indeed, in 
a great many places voting still took place in a ‘hotel,’ which made resort to spirituous 
refreshment both onvenient and tempting.”). BENSEL, supra note 31, at 20 (“[T]he street or 
square outside the voting window frequently became a kind of alcoholic festival in which 
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Polling places were routinely rife with party operatives engaged in vote-buying 
efforts, “distribut[ing] tickets [to voters], lin[ing] up last minute vote-sellers, 
and monitor[ing] ballot casting to be sure their investments paid off.”38 Far 
from enhancing public confidence in election outcomes, transparency enhanced 
vote buyers’ confidence in their investment.39  
As election corruption persisted, state legislatures routinely attempted to 
restore order in the election process.40 But such attempts were fruitless in the 
face of majoritarian politics and strong political party grip on the election 
process.41 Statutory attempts to achieve fair and clean elections were repeatedly 
overwhelmed by the power of the party system and even collusion among 
elected officials to thwart anti-fraud measures.42 Ultimately, the reform that 
most effectively reduced corruption also drastically reduced election 
                                                                                                                       
many men were clearly and spectacularly drunk . . . the crowds gathered around the polls 
often insulted voters who appeared to be supporting the opposing party. These insults easily 
moved into various forms of physical intimidation as members of the crowd, either 
individually or in groups, blocked the passage of prospective voters . . . implicitly 
threatening violence if the voter pressed his way forward.”). 
 38  Frederic Charles Schaffer, Might Cleaning Up Elections Keep People Away from the 
Polls?, 23 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 69, 75 (2002). One account detailed party workers armed 
with “improper tickets . . . headed by the name of one party but containing the names of the 
other party’s candidates, in order to deceive the unwary voter.” MCCORMICK, supra note 32, 
at 114. 
 39  Casting votes was not the only raucous process. Historians depict debauched tallying 
environments as well. Counting often took place in private residences or in less-than-
dignified public facilities. One account describes a barroom tally where little separated the 
reveling masses from the counting tables. BENSEL, supra note 31, at 50–51 (describing a 
scene in 1858: “William Stokely, one of the canvassers, described the enclosed area in which 
the voting and counting occurred as about ‘ten feet wide by nineteen feet long . . . .’ 
Although the bar was closed to paying customers, liquor passed freely between the barroom 
and the men inside this space both during the hours when the polls were open and afterward 
when the counting of the tickets was conducted.”). 
 40  New Jersey’s well-documented experience in this regard is illustrative. In 1871 the 
New Jersey legislature passed by wide margin what was described as a drastic act: depriving 
those who bribed or received bribes for votes the right to vote. New Jersey’s governor 
offered law officers rewards for enforcing the new law, prompting his successor to later 
pronounce that “No recent act of legislation has given such general satisfaction, or been 
more rigidly enforced.” MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 151. These evaluations “proved to be 
somewhat extravagant,” as rampant fraud soared in New Jersey well after. Id.  
 41  Characterizing the period between 1839 and 1876, historian Richard McCormick 
describes how political parties commonly circumvented legislative attempts to right the ship: 
“[P]arty organizations became highly perfected instruments for controlling votes, and each 
party understandably viewed every [reform] proposal . . . from its own biased 
perspective . . . [S]ound and reasonable proposals—such as those relating to registration of 
voters, [a]ssembly districts, or bipartisan election boards—might be twisted into flagrantly 
partisan schemes for gaining an advantage over the opposition.” Id. at 155.  
 42  Id. at 165–66 (describing elections in nineteenth-century New Jersey: “Election 
boards were theoretically bipartisan in that one of the members represented the minority 
party. But all too often the minority member proved to be a willing confederate of the 
majority in sanctioning frauds.”). 
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transparency: the secret ballot. Reformers saw the secret ballot as a means of 
foiling would-be vote buyers by taking away their ability to confirm purchased 
votes. By 1896, ninety percent of U.S. states had moved to secret balloting; 
many had amended their constitutions to require it.43  
The secret ballot was not, however, the only transparency-constricting 
reform of this era. Attempts to rid elections of fraud proved difficult when 
political parties still dominated the mechanics of elections. Thus reformers 
aimed their sights at constraining political parties’ role in election 
administration. In the late 1800s, and the early part of the twentieth century, 
reformers instituted a series of election reforms intended to bring voting 
processes and procedures under state purview.44 Reformers sought to cut 
political parties out of their dominant role in running U.S. elections by limiting 
their grip on election officiating;45 moving polling locations to suitable public 
buildings;46 requiring government-run (and -funded) ballot printing and 
distribution, including strict state regulation of ballot design;47 and instituting a 
                                                                                                                       
 43  Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 204–05 (1992) (citing Jerrold Glenn Rusk, The 
Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting 1876–1908 (1968) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, SUB Gottingen)). 
 44  Frank O’Gorman, The Secret Ballot in Nineteenth-Century Britain, in THE HIDDEN 
HISTORY OF THE SECRET BALLOT, supra note 27, at 16, 30–31. O’Gorman notes other 
examples of transparency restrictions the secret ballot entailed, for example abolition of the 
practice of publishing poll books that revealed individual voter choice. Id. at 32.  
 45  Examples of public agitation for nonpartisan election officials included a petition 
from New York suggesting that “the ballot should be delivered to the voter within the 
polling-place on election day, by sworn public officials.” ALBRIGHT, supra note 22, at 26 
(citing a New York Ballot Reform League petition). Summarizing advocacy for ballot 
reform, Albright suggests that, “[i]n brief, the two features usually advocated by [reform] 
organizations were first, an official uniform ballot, printed at public expense, and, second, 
secret voting within the polling-place under official supervision.” Id. States passed laws to 
curtail the overtly partisan nature of election officiating. In New Jersey, for example, an 
1889 bill adopted a somewhat contorted process intended to diffuse the power of parties in 
selecting election officials:  
 
The governor appointed annually in each county a four-man board made up of two men 
nominated by the state chairmen of each of the major parties. The county boards in turn 
appointed, on the nomination of the county party chairmen, similar bipartisan, four-man 
district boards of elections. The board members served for one-year terms and were 
required to be residents of the district. Each board appointed two poll clerks. 
  
MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 177. McCormick describes a method instituted in 1911 to 
appoint officials whereby “the county chairmen of the two major parties each nominated two 
or more men of good moral character.” The Civil Service Commission would then conduct 
annual examinations of the nominees for fitness. In addition, the reforms limited the terms in 
office of election officials to two years. Id. at 209. 
 46  MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 179 (explaining that municipal officials were 
instructed to provide suitable rooms). 
 47  The state-printed ballot profoundly impacted political processes in this country in 
ways beyond election administration. See KORNBLUH, supra note 26, at 124–126 (discussing 
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system of voter registration that cut out the party middleman from deciding who 
approached the polls.48  
Reformers drafted legislation to ensure cast-ballot security, ranging from 
strict chain-of-custody provisions to ballot box sealing rules.49 Many state 
legislatures implemented laws requiring that cast ballots be destroyed post-
election, usually after a specified period to ensure finality of results.50 These 
measures constricted transparency by bringing much of the voting process 
behind an official veil. By erecting transparency boundaries, reformers sought 
to bolster public confidence and tame the circus elections had become. 
Although states wrested control of most voting processes from political 
parties, reformers understood that transparency could not be eliminated. 
Political parties would be unwilling to cede power without mechanisms to 
confirm the other party had not committed fraud or otherwise stolen the vote. 
Those unhappy with election outcomes would allege fraud, corruption, or 
official collusion in throwing the election if elections were conducted entirely 
out of view. State legislatures therefore passed statutes giving explicit roles to 
party representatives in election processes, creating a system of what will be 
                                                                                                                       
the impact of the state-printed ballot on state party politics). Government controlled ballot 
printing and distribution transformed election mechanics. First, the cost to the state of 
running elections greatly increased. As a result, states began to consolidate elections and 
terms of office lengthened. Id. Second, ballot design became an important means of ensuring 
that party operatives were not able to slip fraudulent ballots into the box. For example, in the 
1930s, Arkansas’s “Pure Election Law” required ballots to include carbon copies with a line 
for voters to sign on the duplicate copy. The box containing signed duplicates was to remain 
unopened unless an election contest ensued. ALBRIGHT, supra note 22, at 46–47. States also 
experimented with signed ballot “stubs” as a means of verifying that voters who entered the 
polling place cast the same ballot they were handed. Id. at 44. Some states developed ballots 
equipped with numbered stubs. Stubs typically contained a consecutive numbering system 
such that the ballot cast could be matched with ballot handed to the voter. Early versions of 
ballot stubs required voters to write their names on the stub linking the voter’s name to the 
ballot number. Id. Other states required election judges, sometimes including the 
requirement that judges be from different political parties, to initial the stub. Id. at 46. 
 48  KORNBLUH, supra note 26, at 133. By 1920, thirty-six states had adopted personal 
registration systems that required individuals to personally register and periodically re-
register to vote. Registration reforms thus “wrested control of the registration process from 
the parties and turned it over to civil servants.” Id. 
 49  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.805 (West 2005) (“After all ballots are 
tied in packages or rolls, the board of election inspectors shall place the ballots in ballot bags 
approved by the secretary of state. The board of election inspectors shall then seal the bags 
with an approved seal. . . .”).  
 50  Many jurisdictions still follow this practice. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.493 
(West 2014) (“After twenty-two months, the ballots, ballot cards, processed ballot materials 
in electronic form, write-in forms, applications, statements, certificates, affidavits and 
computer programs relating to each election may be destroyed.”); see also Price v. Town of 
Fairlee, 26 A.3d 26, 34 (Vt. 2011) (granting citizen access to voted ballots and tally sheet 
two years after an election under Vermont’s public records act despite statutory instruction 
that material be destroyed ninety days from the date of the election). 
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termed here “structured transparency.”51 Structured transparency rules consisted 
of defined roles for political party representatives at various stages in the 
election process. Some state statutes required that election officers be drawn 
from opposing political parties.52 Others passed poll watcher statutes that 
required one representative from each major party to observe each phase of the 
voting process.53 These statutes knighted campaign and political party 
representatives to act as proxies for public oversight throughout the election 
process. State poll watcher and counting-observation statutes of this era 
typically allowed only major political parties and candidates to appoint poll 
watchers and counting observers as party or candidate representatives.54 Often 
statutes required party and candidate representatives to register or receive 
                                                                                                                       
 51  Interestingly, I found no evidence that structured transparency included a formal role 
for the press. I found evidence of no Progressive Era statute formally allowing members of 
the press access inside polling places, although several accounts from this era detail press 
involvement in verifying and communicating election returns to the public. See, e.g., 
ROBERT J. DINKIN, ELECTION DAY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 122 (2002). In many states, 
the press plays a central role in conducting exit polling and communicating electoral 
outcomes. See James Brown & Paul L. Hain, Private Administration of a Public Function: 
The News Election Service, 2 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 389, 396 (1980). As discussed below, 
since 2000, the press (both traditional and nontraditional) has become more aggressive in 
monitoring the election process. See Aimee Edmonson, Election Transparency: The Next 
Great FOI Story?, NATIONAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COALITION, 
http://www.nfoic.org/print/election-transparency, archived at http://perma.cc/W79Q-BKEA. 
 52  See MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 177. 
 53  Most states allowed one poll watcher from each party and/or one poll watcher 
representing each candidate to view the voting process. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-
603 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN § 101.131(1) (West 2014); see also Daniels, supra note 10, at 
250. Many states have explicit rules allowing party representatives to oversee vote counting. 
E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-22-2 (West 2013) (permitting party and candidate 
representatives to observe vote counting). Interestingly, this statute notes that while vote 
counting must be public, “no notice or advertisement of these [vote counting] sessions needs 
to be given.” Id. 
 54  Many states still confine access to political party representatives and candidates. 
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408 (West 2014) (“In an election or run-off election, each 
political party and political body shall each be entitled to designate, at least seven days prior 
to . . . such election or run-off election, no more than two official poll watchers [in each 
precinct] to be selected by the appropriate party or body executive committee.”); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-15-109 (2013) (“The county chairman of each political party may certify 
poll watchers prior to the day of the election to serve in each precinct. Not more than one (1) 
poll watcher from each political party may serve simultaneously unless the chief judge 
determines that one (1) additional poll watcher from each political party may be 
accommodated in the polling premises without disrupting the polling process.”). More 
recently, several states have passed statutes that do not restrict poll watchers to political 
party representatives. Beginning in 1990, for example, a Wisconsin statute grants any 
member of the public the right to observe at polling places. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 7.41(1) (West 
2013) (“Any member of the public may be present at any polling place, . . . except a 
candidate whose name appears on the ballot at the polling place. . . .”). 
2014] RETHINKING TRANSPARENCY 791 
 
accreditation from parties or candidates prior to assuming observer roles,55 and 
included strict rules for where observers could stand and what they could see.56 
States also wrote procedures for party and candidate representatives to observe 
vote counting at the close of elections and during recounts.57 In this way, 
Progressive Era transparency reforms carefully calibrated transparency to 
impose order on what had been an unruly and undignified process.58 As will be 
discussed further below, many state election codes still feature structured 
                                                                                                                       
 55  E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 15, § 4977 (West 2007) (mandating that poll watchers be 
accredited). 
 56  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-8-7 (LexisNexis 2007) (describing process by which 
party-appointed poll watchers may observe certain election processes including monitoring 
poll opening, observing inside the polling place on election day, and monitoring vote 
counting). 
 57  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 353 (1907) (“Each political party or organization having 
candidates nominated may . . . name a watcher who shall be permitted to be present at the 
place where the ballots are cast from the time the polls are opened until the ballots are 
counted and certificates of the result of the election signed by the inspectors.”); IND. CODE 
§ 6248 (1901) (“No person, other than the members of the election board, poll clerks, 
election sheriffs and the duly authorized watchers representing the various political parties, 
shall be permitted in the room during the election, or during the canvass of the votes, except 
for the purpose of voting.”). 
 58  Even state-dominated election administration had a limited ability to prevent 
widespread election wrongdoing, as witnessed during the Civil Rights Era when the 
dominant party and state governments colluded to prevent minority voting. Just as party-
dominated election processes corrupted the electoral process the century before, so too did 
state-managed elections in the Jim Crow South disfigure election processes. Whether in the 
form of poll taxes, literacy tests, registration barriers, intimidation at the polls, or bald 
violence, minority voters were effectively denied meaningful electoral participation. See 
STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944–1969, at 131–32 
(1976) (describing racial violence at polling places). Transparency measures played a critical 
role in the federal electoral reforms of the 1960s aimed at preventing discrimination in the 
South. A prominent example is federal observer provisions in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
(VRA). See H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 29 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 
2460. The VRA authorizes federal courts and the U.S. Attorney General to send federal 
observers to certified jurisdictions to “secure equal voting rights of all citizens.” Id. Under 
the VRA, the Department of Justice is empowered to dispatch federal observers to observe 
polling and ballot counting locations throughout the South. Federal observers were an 
important part of documenting enduring discrimination and ensuring that laws intending to 
prevent discrimination took effect on the ground. See James Thomas Tucker, The Power of 
Observation: The Role of Federal Observers Under the Voting Rights Act, 13 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 227, 230 (2007) (describing federal observers under the VRA as “non-lawyer 
employees of the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) authorized to 
observe ‘whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote’ and ‘whether 
votes cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated.”’). It will be interesting to 
see whether federal observer provisions of the VRA survive (and potentially thrive) 
following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Section 4 coverage formula in Shelby 
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). See also Gray, supra note 11 (arguing for 
expanded federal observation under the Voting Rights Act). 
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transparency provisions giving explicit roles to candidate and party 
representatives as the deputized eyes and ears of the public.59 
Other than 1960s-era federal civil rights statutes mandating federal 
observation of voting in certain (mostly Southern) states,60 structured 
transparency norms continued on an unremarkable path until the 2000 
presidential election when major shortcomings in our system of elections were 
alarmingly exposed.61 Since Bush v. Gore, reliance on structured transparency 
has begun to buckle amidst radically changed circumstances. Changes in the 
way Americans vote, the digitization of U.S. elections, and changing oversight 
norms since Bush v. Gore have combined to challenge basic principles of 
structured transparency—and election oversight generally. Throughout U.S. 
history, transparency rules and norms have adapted to changed circumstances; 
as the next section demonstrates, public faith in electoral outcomes suffers when 
state transparency rules fail to adapt. 
III. POST-BUSH V. GORE: RADICALLY CHANGED ELECTION LANDSCAPE 
Since Bush v. Gore, the country has witnessed a series of fundamental shifts 
that markedly destabilized the election transparency balance. This section 
describes these changes and the failure of transparency rules to adapt to them. 
The first part reviews the changed nature of American voting and the reasons 
why structured transparency norms fall short given new voting realities. The 
next part examines the digitization of U.S. election administration and its 
resulting promise and peril for election transparency. The final part of this 
section explores how changes in oversight culture place stress on structured 
election oversight norms.  
A. Changes in Voting 
Before 1980, less than 5% of the U.S. voting public cast ballots before 
election day, typically through mail-in absentee voting.62 By 2000, 14% of 
voters nationwide cast early ballots; by 2004, 20% of Americans voted before 
                                                                                                                       
 59  See, e.g., supra note 54. 
 60  See generally Tucker, supra note 58. 
 61  See Adler & Hall, supra note 12, at 147. 
 62  Michael P. McDonald, A Modest Early Voting Rise in 2012, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 12, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/a-modest-
early-voting-ris_b_3430379.html, archived at  http://perma.cc/PTQ4-E8TZ; see also John C. 
Fortier, Early Voting a Boon to Whom?, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/John_C__Fortier_F39B1257-0631-4A87-AAE3-
28784D8EC040.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y42Y-EM6G. 
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election day.63 In the 2008 presidential election, 30.6% of American voters cast 
their vote before election day.64  














In the past, many states required voters who requested to vote by mail to 
provide an excuse for why they could not vote at the polls on election day. 
States often created lists of permissible excuses entitling voters to mail-in 
ballots. Today, twenty-seven states (and the District of Columbia) allow no-
excuse absentee or mail-in voting.66 Three states, Washington, Oregon, and 
Colorado, are experimenting with all-mail elections, doing away with polling 
places altogether. 67 
                                                                                                                       
 63  THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, BALANCING ACCESS AND INTEGRITY 65 (2005), 
http://old.tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb542/baichap6.pdf. 
 64  2012 Early Voting Statistics, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elections.gmu.edu/ 
early_vote_2012.html (last updated Nov. 6, 2012),  archived at http://perma.cc/HTV2-
2Q6V.  
 65  McDonald, supra note 62. The 2013 Presidential Commission on Election 
Administration Report’s endorsement of expanded opportunities for early and mail-in voting 
seems sure to feed the wave. THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 56 
(2014) [hereinafter PCEA REPORT] (“Recommendation: States should expand opportunities 
to vote before Election Day.”). 
 66  See Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/F3PM-XCXH?type=image. 
 67  COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-7.5-104 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 254.465 (2013); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.40.010 (West 2014). Other states are toying with all-mail 
voting. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4001 (West 2014) (pilot program in Yolo county that 
allows mail-in only elections). Some states are experimenting with designating certain areas 
for mail-in elections (for example, for small districts or districts far from polling stations). 
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.343 (LexisNexis 2013) (small districts and districts 
which the county clerk deems mail voting districts are mail voting districts); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-6-22.1 (LexisNexis 2012) (mail-in districts created when district is 100 voters or 
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In addition to expanded mail-in voting, many states have introduced and 
expanded early in-person voting opportunities (EIPV).68 As distinguished from 
voting by mail, EIPV allows voters to cast ballots at designated locations for a 
specified period before election day. Early voting garnered significant attention 
in the 2012 election. Campaigns pushed supporters to cast early ballots for a 
variety of strategic reasons.69 In 2012, President Obama became the first major 
presidential candidate to cast an early vote.70 Like lists of voters who requested 
mail-in ballots, lists of voters who cast votes early have become valuable to 
campaigns and groups interested in election oversight.71  
Provisional voting is another example of a nontraditional form of voting on 
the rise. To address the problem of voters being turned away wrongfully at the 
polls, the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA)72 mandated that voters whose 
eligibility to vote is in question at the polls be offered a provisional ballot.73 
                                                                                                                       
less and nearest polling place is twenty miles away or more); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-302 
(LexisNexis 2013) (election officer may choose to conduct election entirely by mail-in 
ballot). 
 68  According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, any qualified voter in 
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia may cast a ballot in person during a 
designated period prior to election day.  No excuse or justification is required. See Absentee 
and Early Voting, supra note 66.  
 69  See, e.g., Jenna Johnson, Campaigns Still Pushing Early Voting in Iowa, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/11/05/ 
campaigns-still-pushing-early-voting-in-iowa/, archived at http://perma.cc/682J-6W62; 
Sasha Issenberg, How President Obama’s Campaign Used Big Data to Rally Individual 
Voters, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/ 
509026/how-obamas-team-used-big-data-to-rally-voters/, archived at http://perma.cc/V64P-
PG9S; Nick Judd, Why Campaigns Are Happy Your Vote Isn’t as Private as Many Think It 
Is, TECHPRESIDENT (Oct. 22, 2012), http://techpresident.com/news/23032/do-you-care-if-
obama-knows-you-voted-what-about-if-he-told-your-friends, archived at 
http://perma.cc/73GL-2FQC. 
 70  Gregory J. Krieg, Obama Casts Early Vote and Reminds Dems of 2000 Recount, 
ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/obama-cast-early-vote-
reminds-dems-2000-recount/story?id=17563272#.UX8XfyuFSbw, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7VDC-EELW. 
 71  See Nancy Hicks, Mail-in Mission: Campaigns Chasing Early Votes, LINCOLN 
JOURNAL STAR (Apr. 13, 2013), http://journalstar.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/mail-in-
mission-campaigns-chasing-early-votes/article_b40cd17e-c35a-5346-9690-89ab6e242c50. 
html, archived at http://perma.cc/6447-4MML (discussing the targeting of early voters 
noting that 85–90% of those who request ballots cast them);  Michael P. McDonald, Early 
Voting in 2012: What to Expect, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2012, 4:19 
PM),  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/early-voting-in-2012-what_b_ 
1773768.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C6CG-UXT4 (examining the ways campaigns 
use early voting data). 
 72  Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 302, 116 Stat. 
1706 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2012)).  
 73  The reasons a voter may be offered a provisional ballot include but are not limited 
to:  
2014] RETHINKING TRANSPARENCY 795 
 
Once handed a provisional ballot, the provisional voter must sign an affidavit 
declaring that she is eligible and registered to vote in that jurisdiction. If the 
voter is later confirmed to be eligible, HAVA requires that the state must count 
that provisional ballot.74  
The volume of provisional votes cast since HAVA mandated their existence 
is far from trivial. In the 2012 presidential election, for example, Kansas issued 
38,865 provisional ballots, 3.5% of all ballots cast.75 Election officials in 
Kansas rejected approximately 35% of provisional votes cast.76 States like 
Pennsylvania have seen sharp increases in provisional voting rates. In 2008, 
Pennsylvania voters cast 33,000 provisional ballots.77 In 2012, Pennsylvania 
election officials issued 49,000 provisional ballots (even though voter turnout in 
Pennsylvania decreased).78  Ohio has issued provisional ballots at the highest 
rate of any state in the country. In the 2012 presidential election, Ohioans cast 
208,087 provisional ballots.79 
New trends in voting have wreaked havoc on the ability of existing 
transparency rules to inspire confidence in electoral outcomes. Few state 
transparency statutes explicitly mention mail-in ballot envelopes, lists of mail-
in, early and provisional voters, or access to electronic poll books. In recent 
years, the nation has discovered how old rules very often fail to adequately 
account for new transparency demands. The Franken–Coleman U.S. Senate 
recount in Minnesota provides a dramatic early example. During the November 
2008 election, 281,291 Minnesota voters (9.6% of total votes cast) cast civilian 
mail-in ballots.80 When the vote totals separated the candidates by only 215 
                                                                                                                       
1. The voter’s name does not appear on the official list of voters at his or her polling 
place 
2. The voter’s eligibility is challenged in accordance with state law  
3. A court order requiring provisional ballots 
4. A court order extending polling place hours  
5. State law mandates provisional ballots.  
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, VOTER GUIDE (2011), available at 
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/EAC_VotersGuidePrint%20(2).pdf. 
 74  HAVA § 302(a). 
 75 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND 
VOTING SURVEY (2013), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/990-
050%20EAC%20VoterSurvey_508Compliant.pdf. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Election officials counted 173,765 provisional ballots and rejected 34,322. Ohio 
Secretary of State Husted Releases Absentee and Provisional Ballot Reports for 2012 
Presidential Election, OHIO SECRETARY ST. (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/mediaCenter/2013/2013-01-09a.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/T3ZL-YBA7?type=source.  
 80  According to The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, an additional 11,255 voters 
cast ballots under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 2008 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING 
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votes,81 the Franken recount team’s preliminary litigation strategy focused on 
mail-in ballots. The Franken team’s first move was to file a series of Minnesota 
Data Practices Act suits when election officials in many counties (including 
populous Ramsey County) refused to turn over the names of mail-in voters.82 
Some counties, such as Beltrami County in northwest Minnesota, complied with 
the Franken team’s requests. Others did not. When Franken sued for access, 
Minnesota courts had difficulty agreeing on how to classify mail-in ballot 
materials under the Act.83 Explained lead recount attorney Marc Elias, “This is 
about giving us access to the data that will allow us to determine whether or not 
there are lawful ballots.”84 Elias did not just want access to the mail-in ballots 
themselves. He sought access to everything: mail-in ballot envelopes; lists of 
voters who voted by mail; rules and training manuals governing election 
administration in the state; anything and everything that would help him build 
his case.85  
The press pushed back on Elias’s strategy to find and question mail-in 
voters in counties that turned over mail-in voting lists and other materials. One 
reporter wondered, “[m]ight that be seen as some level of [voter] 
intimidation?”86 But the media didn’t wonder long. Soon reporters got into the 
game of ferreting out mail-in voters to “f[ind] real people whose real votes were 
in real doubt.”87 State statutes were unprepared for such access requests, leaving 
judges to decide. 
Even in less dramatic circumstances, non-polling place voting presents 
numerous transparency challenges. Observers have cautioned that voting by 
mail increases opportunities for fraud.88 At polling places, strict laws define 
                                                                                                                       
SURVEY (2009), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2008%20Election 
%20Administration%20and%20Voting%20Survey%20EAVS%20Report.pdf. 
 81  MINN. SEC’Y ST., THE STATE OF MINNESOTA CANVASSING REPORT (2008).  
 82  Jay Weiner, The Coleman-Franken Recount: See You in Court Sooner—and Later, 
MINNPOST (Nov. 13, 2008), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/11/coleman-
franken-recount-see-you-court-sooner-–-and-later, archived at http://perma.cc/935C-Y2BE 
(“[T]he Franken campaign requested that information under the state’s Data Practices Act. 
[A Ramsey County election official] and election officials in many other counties, including 
Hennepin, denied the request. Some county officials gladly handed over the data, including 
the elections chief in Beltrami County. . . .”). 
 83  Even after the recount had concluded, it took a separate suit by local media to 
determine the status of mail-in ballot materials under Minnesota’s Data Practices Act. 
KSTP-TV v. Ramsey Cnty., 806 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Minn. 2011) (holding that sealed mail-in 
ballots constituted non-public government data, and thus, television stations were precluded 
from accessing and copying the ballots). 
 84  JAY WEINER, THIS IS NOT FLORIDA: HOW AL FRANKEN WON THE MINNESOTA 
SENATE RECOUNT 42 (2010). 
 85  Interview with Marc Elias, Partner, Perkins Coie (May 30, 2013). 
 86  WEINER, supra note 84, at 43. 
 87  Id.  
 88  E.g., Allison R. Hayward, Bentham and Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and 
Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & POL. 39, 58 (2010) (“Innovations like ‘no 
excuses’ absentee voting and permanent absentee status, by broadening the base of voters 
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circumstances when voters may receive help when casting their vote; otherwise, 
the voter must enter the private booth alone.89 Not so for a ballot cast in a living 
room. Mail-in ballot fraud can take place in numerous ways, for example, 
watchdog groups claim that election fraudsters in Florida paid elderly Hispanic 
voters for their mail-in ballots in 2012.90 Critics of mail-in voting also cite 
instances of intimidation of mail-in voters, concerns about mail-in voter 
privacy, and a lack of audit standards in mail-in vote tabulation.91  
States have done little to confront oversight problems associated with mail-
in voting. Most states allow members of the public to access lists of people who 
have cast early in-person or mail-in ballots prior to election day.92 Several mail-
                                                                                                                       
voting outside the protection of the polls, would logically increases [sic] the availability of 
absentee ballots for fraud. But even in jurisdictions where these innovations have not been 
adopted, a culture of absentee fraud can flourish. With the cooperation of a willing notary, 
for example, even the affidavit provisions of these stricter laws provide no guarantee against 
fraud.”). In Oregon and Washington, all-mail-vote states, criticism has been especially 
pointed. See, e.g., Brad Friedman, Why ‘Vote-by-Mail’ Elections Are a Terrible Idea for 
Democracy, BRAD BLOG (May 20, 2008, 6:35 AM), http://www.bradblog.com/?p=6003, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BQ3A-AGZ7 (“Many are unaware that their mailed-in ballots 
will be scanned by the same error-prone, easily manipulated optical-scan machines which 
handle paper ballots for precinct-based voting. But even worse, ballots mailed in, if they 
arrive safely, and are counted at all, are usually counted ‘in the dark,’ versus ballots scanned 
either at the polls on election day, or at county headquarters after the close of polls when 
citizens are often there to watch. It is also much harder to track such ballots. Unlike ballots 
cast at the polls, where sign-in rosters can be compared to the number of ballots counted, it’s 
far more difficult to match up such numbers after ballots are dropped into the black hole that 
is the U.S. Postal System.”); Jason Mercier, What Oregon Can Teach Us About Mail-in 
Voting, CROSSCUT (Nov. 1, 2012), http://crosscut.com/2012/11/01/elections/111266/ 
election-results-weeks-waiting-mail-voting/, archived at http://perma.cc/S7WF-DEKT 
(“[T]he real problem of Washington’s month-long election is the cynicism and distrust it 
unnecessarily breeds in the state’s election results.”). 
 89  E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-2-2 (West 2013) (requiring that voters must “[m]ark 
the ballot in the presence of no other person, unless the voter requests help in marking a 
ballot under [§] 3-11-9.”). 
 90  Marianela Toledo, Absentee Ballot Fraud Rampant in Florida, 
FLORIDAWATCHDOG.ORG (Aug. 16, 2013), http://watchdog.org/101444/absentee-ballot-
fraud-rampant-in-florida/, archived at http://perma.cc/CGK2-8Z2F; see also Adam Liptak, 
Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/us/politics/as-more-vote-by-mail-faulty-ballots-could-
impact elections.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/4C3X-F7KC. 
 91  Daniel P. Tokaji & Ruth Colker, Absentee Voting by People with Disabilities: 
Promoting Access and Integrity, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1015, 1024–28 (2007) (discussing 
concerns about mail-in voting including inter alia security, fraud, and lack of privacy). 
 92  E.g., ALA. CODE § 17-11-5 (LexisNexis 2007) (list of mail-in ballot applicants is 
publicly posted and accessible); ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.180 (2012) (mail-in voter list open to 
public inspection); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3203(b)(3) (West 2014) (list of vote by mail ballot 
recipients is kept open to public inspection); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-140(c) (West 2014) 
(list of names of those who returned a mail-in ballot are kept as public records); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 21-2-384(d) (West 2014) (list of voters that voted by mail-in ballot is kept as a public 
record); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1011 (2008) (list of applicants for mail-in ballots are kept as 
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in ballot transparency statutes delay public access until after election day has 
passed.93 Some states include specific provisions for challenging mail-in voters 
during the counting process.94 Several states, following the structured oversight 
model, restrict access to early and mail-in voting lists to political parties and 
candidates.95 Texas maintains a strict bar on public access to early in-person 
and mail-in voter material.96 Hawaii has a fine example of a poorly drafted 
election transparency statute. The public may access information about voter 
“status,” but that word is undefined, leaving access specifics to anyone’s 
guess.97 
As numerous candidates, members of the press, and election oversight 
activists have discovered, vague pronouncements about accessibility of mail-in 
                                                                                                                       
public records); IOWA CODE ANN. § 53.19 (West 2012) (requires a list of mail-in voters be 
kept for each district); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 759 (2013) (right to inspect mail-in ballot 
applications and envelopes on or before election day); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 203B.04(1)(d) 
(West 2009) (lists of mail-in voters are available after elections close); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-15-625 (West 2012) (list of absentee ballot recipients is available for inspection); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 115.289 (West 2014) (list of names of mail-in voters are subject to public 
inspection); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-948 (2008) (records of early voter information is open to 
the public); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293C.312 (LexisNexis 2013) (application for mail-in 
open to inspection); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-6-6 (LexisNexis 2012) (mail-in voter register is 
open for public inspection); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-232 (West 2013) (list of mail-in 
voters is open for public inspection); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-258.26 (West 2013) 
(military absentee voter list is open for public inspection); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 14-
130 (West 2014) (post names who requested mail-in ballots); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-15-440 
(2012) (list of mail-in ballot recipients is available for public inspection); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 20A-3-304.1(4) (LexisNexis 2013) (mail-in voter information is subject to public records 
request); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2534 (2012) (list of early and mail-in voters is available 
for inspection); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-710 (2014) (list of mail-in voters is open to public 
inspection); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-706 (2014) (mail-in voter applicants names are subject to 
public inspection); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2b (LexisNexis 2013) (list of special mail-in 
voters is a permanent record).  
 93  E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 203B.04(1)(d) (West 2009) (lists of mail-in voters are 
available after elections close). 
 94  E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-416 (West 2013) (counting of mail-in ballots is open to 
the public, the name of each mail-in voter is called off so challenges may be issued). 
 95  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7585 (West 2007) (mail-in voter files are sent to the 
candidates on the ballot); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.5-4-15 (West 2013) (mail-in voters are 
marked on poll lists and the names are announced to watchers); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-6-8-1 
(West 2013) (candidates may appoint watchers); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657:15 (2013) 
(candidates may receive list of mail-in voters); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-05-09 (West 
2013) (election observers allowed access to early and mail-in voting); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 3146.2c (West 2014) (list of mail-in voters is posted but copies may only be given to 
candidates); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-6-304 (2003) (mail-in voters’ names recorded in absentee 
poll book); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-8-116 (2003) (all candidates have the right to poll list 
copies). 
 96  TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 87.121(f) (West 2010) (express bar on access to lists of 
persons who have requested early ballots, though lists of individuals who have voted early 
are accessible). 
 97  HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-97 (West 2008). 
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and early voting materials before, during, and after election day commonly 
crumble under the weight of election controversy. Often, discerning which 
nontraditional voting materials are available to whom falls to individual county 
clerk’s assessments of equivocal (and sometimes conflicting) statutory 
commands and administrative norms. Decisions—by clerks and courts—made 
in this statutory vacuum very often bear the whiff of partisan favoritism.98 The 
problem is acute in the area of provisional voting.  
HAVA requires states to make available to voters who have cast provisional 
ballots a means to verify the status of their provisional ballots.99 But HAVA 
specifically restricts access to information about the fate of a cast provisional 
ballot to the voter.100 Provisional voting has been controversial in part because 
the federal mandate requires states to fill in many gaps, including gaps in the 
provisional voting transparency regime.101 Like mail-in ballots, processing 
provisional ballots implicates materials other than the provisional ballots 
themselves such as lists of provisional voters, poll books, provisional ballot 
envelopes, and affidavits. And like mail-in voting materials, provisional voting 
produces election materials to which candidates, parties, and citizens will 
inevitably demand access when races are close.  
Statutory incoherence in the case of public access to provisional balloting 
material is pronounced. Fifteen states expressly allow members of the public to 
access lists of voters who cast provisional ballots.102 Four states allow access to 
                                                                                                                       
  98   See supra note 82. 
 99  42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)(5)(B) (2012) (“The appropriate State or local election official 
shall establish a free access system (such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet 
website) that any individual who casts a provisional ballot may access to discover whether 
the vote of that individual was counted, and, if the vote was not counted, the reason that the 
vote was not counted.”). 
 100  42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2012) (“The appropriate State or local official shall establish and 
maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and 
integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by the free access 
system established under paragraph (5)(B). Access to information about an individual 
provisional ballot shall be restricted to the individual who cast the ballot.”). 
 101  The provisional ballot requirements raise quite a few other concerns outside the 
transparency context. See generally Edward B. Foley, The Promise and Problems of 
Provisional Voting, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1193 (2005). 
 102  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4979 (West 2007) (allows oaths and affidavits to be seen, 
not a set list); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.0981 (West 2014) (voter history is part of electronic 
register system, electronic register system is open to public records requests); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 21-2-72 (West 2014) (affidavits and election records are open to inspection); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 3-10-1-31.1(c) (West 2013) (provisional voting materials are open to 
inspection); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1122 (West 2013) (list of provisional voters may be 
inspected); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.225 (LexisNexis 2004) (provisional voters must sign 
precinct list); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.025 (LexisNexis 2004) (precinct lists are available 
for inspection); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 10-311 (LexisNexis 2010) (watchers may 
keep lists of provisional voters); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.735 (West 2005) 
(provisional voters are recorded in the poll book); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.733 (West 
2005) (poll watchers may view poll books); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.430 (West 2014) 
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lists of challenged voters, which may (or may not) include voters who cast 
provisional ballots.103 Oklahoma allows access to information about provisional 
voters, but only after a one-week waiting period or after a recount has ended.104 
Eight states affirmatively forbid access to provisional voting materials.105 
Eighteen state election codes make no mention of access to provisional voting 
materials at all.106  
The question of access to names of provisional voters has found its way into 
court on numerous occasions. In 2004, a Washington court held that lists of 
provisional voters must be released in the name of “the public’s right to an open 
and transparent electoral process. . . .”107 Professor Edward Foley, in a blog post 
on the eve of the 2012 election, raised questions about whether the identity of 
provisional voters in Ohio is public or private. 108 Professor Foley wondered 
                                                                                                                       
(watchers are allowed to see the envelopes and affirmations of provisional voters and 
allowed to make their own list); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-109 (2013) (all records are open 
to public inspection); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.012 (West 2010) (election records are open 
to inspection unless stated otherwise); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-5-401 (LexisNexis 2013) 
(provisional voters marked on poll list); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-308 (LexisNexis 2013) 
(poll list public record); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.45 (West 2013) (provisional voters marked on 
poll lists); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.46 (West 2013) (poll lists open for public inspection); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-2-113 (2013) (election records are public records; copies of registry list 
may be given to candidates). 
 103  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-594 (2006) (clerks will keep a list of challenged voters 
and keep it as a public record); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 673 (2013) (challenged voter list 
is available for public inspection); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-206 (McKinney 2007) (poll watchers 
may look at challenged voter lists). Rhode Island appears to provide access to challenge lists 
only to political parties. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-10-16 (West 2013) (directing that 
challenge list shall be prepared and given to the parties). 
 104  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 7-116.1 (West 2014). 
 105  ALA. CODE § 17-10-2 (LexisNexis 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-308 (2013); CAL. 
ELEC. CODE § 17301 (West 2014); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14310 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18:566.2 (2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 107 (LexisNexis 2006); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 293C.390 (LexisNexis 2013); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3068 (West 2014) 
(voter lists and other materials are sealed); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-20-21 (2004). 
 106  See ALASKA STAT. § 15 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9 (West 2014); D.C. 
CODE § 1-10 (LexisNexis 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 34 (2008); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 39-63 (West 2012); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 652-671 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1 (LexisNexis 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163 
(West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 246-260 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7 (2012); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 2 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2 (2014); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 29 (West 2014). 
 107  Memorandum Opinion and Order, Washington St. Republican Party v. King Cnty. 
Div. of Records, No. 04-2-36048-0 SEA (King Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2004), available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/WSDCC/WSDCCorder2.pdf. 
 108  Edward B. Foley, The Identity of Provisional Voters: Private or Public? (An Issue 
That Might Emerge Early in Overtime), ELECTIONLAW@MORITZ (Oct. 30, 2012, 8:30 PM), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/freefair/index.php?ID=9981, archived at http://perma. 
cc/JP5U-ZFL4?type=image. 
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whether Ohio courts would react similarly. HAVA’s language restricting access 
to information about provisional ballots is arguably clear on its face as a means 
of protecting voter privacy.109 Pondering the tension between Washington’s 
take and what might happen in Ohio courts, Professor Foley voiced concern 
about Ohio’s statutory readiness to confront the question of access to 
provisional voter lists, if, as seemed likely, the election came down to Ohio’s 
provisional ballots.110 Echoing Foley, Jeffrey Toobin worried too: “Pause to 
consider the chaos that would ensue. Both campaigns would try to track down 
the provisional voters, find their proper documentation, and shepherd them 
through the process at the county seat. Ballot-by-ballot warfare—for several 
hundred thousand votes. And that’s just the start.”111As it turned out, Foley and 
Toobin’s fears were not unfounded. Ohio issued 210,000 provisional ballots on 
election day 2012; President Obama won the state by 166,214 votes.112  
Although Ohio ducked provisional ballot controversy in the 2012 
presidential election, it blossomed in the 2012 Kansas house race in the fifty-
fourth district. Ann Mah trailed Ken Corbet by a mere 27 votes out of more than 
10,000 cast.113 Following the election, Mah contacted county officials 
requesting access to lists of voters who had voted provisional ballots intending 
to contact each.114 The 2012 election marked the first statewide election in 
which its new voter ID statute was in effect.115 Mah believed many voters cast 
provisional ballots because of failure to bring proper ID to the polls.116 In 
Kansas, provisional votes will only count if voters can produce proper ID at 
their local election office in advance of the county canvass.117 Candidates, 
therefore, have an incentive to track down individual provisional voters to 
                                                                                                                       
 109  See 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2012). 
 110  Foley, supra note 108. 
 111  Jeffrey Toobin, Ready for a Recount?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/ready-for-a-recount, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AG83-RE6K. 
 112  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ELECTION LAW,  
DIALOGUES ON ELECTION REFORM: A CONTINUING CONVERSATION WITH THE STATES (2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/election_law/dialogues_on_ele
ction_reform.authcheckdam.pdf; See also Election Results: Ohio, HUFFPOST POLITICS, 
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/2012/results/ohio  (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/PF3-GK5N. 
 113  Andy Marso, Bill Shrouding Provisional Ballots Heads to Governor, TOPEKA CAP. 
J. (Apr. 7, 2013, 4:02 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2013-04-07/bill-shrouding-provisional-
ballots-heads-governor, archived at  http://perma.cc/NPS-7HHT. 
 114  Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-218 (West 2010) (providing for inspection of 
public records). Mah, in seeking out provisional voters, hoped to assist in the process of 
curing any problems. See Mah v. Shawnee Cnty. Comm’n, No. 12-4148-JTM, 2012 WL 
5584613, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2012). 
 115  See Collin Levy, Kansas Voter ID Success, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/, archived at http://perma.cc/MR5K-JN8L. 
 116  See Marso, supra note 113.  
 117  Id. 
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ensure they take the necessary steps to verify their eligibility to vote 
(particularly when armed with data about which voters to go after). 
But the Kansas statute did not address whether candidates should be given 
access to lists of provisional voters. Some counties agreed to give Mah access to 
the lists. On November 7, clerks in Douglas and Osage Counties provided Mah 
access to lists of provisional voters.118 The clerk in Douglas County explained 
to the press that, “limited provisional ballot information had always been 
considered [an] open record.”119 This prompted Kansas Secretary of State Kris 
Kobach to release a memo advising clerks that the names of provisional voters 
are not public records and by law cannot be disclosed.120 Kobach’s memo 
further reasoned that requests for post-election materials would, “impede the 
function of [election officials] and provide an additional burden [on election 
officials] at a very busy time.”121  
Consistent with the Kobach memo, the Shawnee County commissioner 
denied Mah’s request arguing that Kansas law prohibited disclosure, “except as 
ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”122 Mah promptly secured an 
order from the Shawnee County court. Like the Washington court in 2004, the 
county court granted the order on the theory that Mah had not requested access 
to information about which candidates specific provisional voters voted for, but 
only the names of voters who voted provisionally.123 
Secretary Kobach immediately obtained an order from a U.S. district court 
to prevent Mah’s court order from taking effect.124 Later, in a ruling on the 
merits, the U.S. district court ruled against Kobach. The Kansas court aligned 
with the Washington court’s holding that the federal law requiring provisional 
voters’ access to the status of their ballots did not bar others seeking access to 
information about who casts provisional ballots. “Access to information about 
[an] individual provisional ballot” the court wrote, “does not protect 
information about the individual casting the ballot.”125 In the end, Corbet 
defeated Mah by twenty-one votes and the Republican-dominated state 
legislature moved to prevent public access to provisional ballot materials.126  
                                                                                                                       
 118 Mah Suit Gains Access to Provisional Voters’ Names, TOPEKA CAP. J. (Nov. 9, 2012, 
1:11 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2012-11-09/mah-suit-gains-access-provisional-voters-
names, archived at http://perma.cc/QC6F-VCJ7. 
 119  Marso, supra note 113. 
 120  Memorandum from Ryan Kriegshauser, Assistant Sec’y of State, Office of the Kan. 
Sec’y of State to Kan. Cnty. Counselors c/o Kan. Cnty. Election Officers (Nov. 8, 2012), 
available at  http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/KansasVoteMemo.pdf. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Marso, supra note 113.  
 123  Mah v. Shawnee Cnty. Comm’n, No. 12-4148-JTM, 2012 WL 5584613, at *1 (D. 
Kan. Nov. 15, 2012). 
 124  Marso, supra note 113. 
 125  Mah, 2012 WL 5584613, at *3. 
 126  S.B. 177, 2013 Leg., (Kan. 2013); Andy Marso, Senate Roundup: Bill Inspired by 
Mah Race Approved, TOPEKA CAP. J. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://m.cjonline.com/news/2013-02-
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Commenting on provisional ballot access in Kansas, a political scientist at 
the University of Missouri expressed concern:  
If legislatures and courts rule that provisional ballot information is not 
public, I expect that absentee, vote-by-mail, and early voting would be the next 
logical targets for a similar ruling. Restricting public access to ballot 
information would impose a significant curb on campaign activity aimed at 
those forms of voting. It is certainly an interesting strategy for curbing post-
election litigation—quash public access to the evidence needed for such 
litigation.127 
Is curbing access to provisional and other new forms of voting materials a 
desirable constriction aimed at preserving the dignity and decorum of elections? 
Or, should such material be made widely available to assure the public that 
ineligible voters did not vote? In the case of state response to provisional ballot 
transparency, the jury appears to be out. 
The story of election officials’ inconsistent responses to requests for access 
to election materials is often told, in part because local election officials— 
keepers of the vast majority of election materials128—are commonly left 
rudderless by vague or inconsistent election transparency statutes. As 
nontraditional forms of voting rise in prominence, the lack of oversight rules 
does damage to public confidence in the legitimacy of our elections and throws 
that uncertainty to judges, who are less than thrilled to enter the political thicket. 
B. The Digitization of U.S. Elections 
In the days when U.S. voters cast paper ballots in voting booths on election 
day, the question of election oversight was relatively straightforward. Even 
when new forms of paper balloting complicated oversight (butterfly ballots are 
a perfect example), the ability to review outcomes still constituted a manual 
review of physical objects. Now that so many voters in the United States vote 
on machines, meaningful oversight of vote tallying has become a more complex 
matter.129   
                                                                                                                       
28/senate-roundup-bill-inspired-mah-race-approved, archived at http://perma.cc/SPG7-
QDFC. 
 127  David Kimball, online comment to Doug Chapin, Controversy Over Provisional 
Ballots Leads to Litigation, Legislation in Kansas, ELECTION ACADEMY (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:18 
AM), 
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2013/04/controversy_over_provisional_b.php, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8PSW-7VJC. 
 128  See, e.g., Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 399 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that federal public access provisions in the National Voting Registration Act did not apply 
until voting records at issue were actually in custody of the state as opposed to being in the 
hands of local level officials). 
 129  Every state that uses voting machines maintains federally mandated pre- and post-
election audit procedures and machine certification. See generally Stephen N. Goggin, 
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When they were first introduced in the early 1900s, voting machines drew 
much skepticism, so much so that their use was often curbed or eliminated.130 
In the years since Bush v. Gore, their use has been on the rise, particularly 
driven by HAVA’s federal funds to purchase new voting equipment. Two 
categories of voting machines have emerged as the most prevalent: direct 
recording electronic machines (DREs) and optical scan machines. In the 2012 
election, approximately 39% of voters cast ballots on DREs and 56% cast 
ballots on paper ballots counted on optical scanners.131 HAVA requires that all 
voting machines have “audit capacity” that can produce a “permanent paper 
record” for manual audit.132 Transparency advocates are quick to point out, 
however, that HAVA fails to require a contemporaneous, or “voter-verified,” 
paper trail.133 Consistent with Election Assistance Commission 
recommendations, many state statutes require DREs to be equipped with voter-
verifiable, paper trail audit capacity.134 Experience has shown, however, that 
audit capabilities may fall short (and can create fresh problems).135  
                                                                                                                       
Michael D. Byrne & Juan E. Gilbert, Post-Election Auditing: Effects of Procedure and 
Ballot Type on Manual Counting Accuracy, Efficiency, and Auditor Satisfaction and 
Confidence, 11 ELECTION L.J. 36 (2012); Tokaji, supra note 7, at 1722; SUSANNAH 
GOODMAN, MICHELLE MULDER & PAMELA SMITH, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION, 
COUNTING VOTES 2012: A STATE BY STATE LOOK AT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PREPAREDNESS 
1 (2012), available at http://countingvotes.org/sites/default/files/CountingVotes2012.pdf. A 
full discussion of the contours of these processes is outside of the scope of this paper, which 
focuses on when and under what circumstances members of the public, candidates, and the 
media may access machines. 
 130  See ALBRIGHT, supra note 22, at 78 (describing alleged bribery by an early voting 
machine manufacturer that led Illinois to abandon the use of electronic voting machines in 
the early twentieth century). Albright describes problems with fraud and machine reliability 
that hindered adoption of voting technology in elections subsequently in other states. Id. As 
described by another historian of the introduction of voting machines in New Jersey in 1907, 
“[m]any citizens were distressed because they could not feel assured that their vote had 
actually been registered, or because they feared that the machine might err in recording the 
totals.” MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 200. By 1911, 321 out of 335 election districts in 
New Jersey had voted to return to the paper ballot. Id. at 201. 
 131 Voting Systems & Use: 1980–2012, PROCON.ORG, http://votingmachines.procon.org/ 
view.resource.php?resourceID=000274 (last updated Feb. 6, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FG5G-NPXK.  In 2000, approximately 12% of registered voters used DRE 
machines and 31% used optical scan machines to cast their vote. Electronic Voting Offers 
Opportunities and Presents Challenges, Testimony Prepared for Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. On Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 11 (2004) (statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director 
Information Technology Architecture and Systems. 
 132 42 U.S.C. §§ 15481(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 133  Tokaji, supra note 7, at 1733; see generally Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology 
and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625 (2002). 
 134  E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-532 (2013) (“The Secretary of State or the county shall 
not purchase or procure a direct-recording electronic voting machine that does not include a 
voter-verified paper audit trail.”); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19270 (West 2014) (“The Secretary of 
State shall not . . . approve a direct recording electronic voting system unless [it] includes an 
accessible voter verified paper audit trail.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 16-42 (West 2008) (“No 
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DRE machines are designed to walk voters through the ballot more 
carefully than paper ballots allow. Machine voting therefore helps ensure that 
ballots are cast without error.136 Even accepting the increased voter accuracy 
machines may enable,137 skeptics voice concern that voters have no means of 
ensuring their vote has registered correctly.138 This has been a perennial 
problem since voting machines first came on the scene.139 Concerns persist 
today. Many voters during the 2012 elections complained of “vote flipping” on 
DRE machines where the machine appeared to register Obama when Romney 
had been selected and vice versa.140 Critics of machine voting also point to 
potential for errors in coding or hacker mischief that are not entirely 
unfounded.141  
                                                                                                                       
electronic voting system shall be used in any election unless it generates a paper ballot or 
voter verifiable paper audit trail. . . .”); see also Technical Guideline Development 
Committee, Recommended Guidelines Part 1: Equipment Requirements, Chapter 4: Security 
and Audit Architecture, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 
http://archives.eac.gov/vvsg/part1/chapter04.php/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9SJ6-XGWK. 
 135  For example, in many states the paper trail capacity consists of a printer attached to 
an existing DRE with a paper spool behind a sheet of glass. During a recount or audit, voting 
officials can count the records on the printer module.  But the spools are continuous sheets 
of paper. If a ballot is spoiled (i.e., a voter completes a ballot and then rejects it), the spoiled 
ballot remains on the spool with the valid ballots. This process can lead to errors in vote 
tallies if election officials erroneously include spoiled ballots in the vote tally. Election 
officials complain that segregating the invalid ballots is a costly and time-consuming 
process. When totals from the paper record do not match machine totals, public confidence 
in the election outcome suffers. Goggin, supra note 129, at 40. 
 136  On a DRE, voters cannot fail to properly fill in a bubble or leave a stray mark that 
confuses an optical scanner. DREs also ensure that voters do not unintentionally overvote 
and may only undervote after receiving a warning they have done so. “Over voting” occurs 
when a voter votes for more than one candidate in a single race. “Under voting” occurs when 
a voter casts no vote in a race. Some voters fail to indicate a choice in error, other voters 
consciously do not vote in some races. See Jason W. Hilliard, Punch Card Ballots v. Direct 
Record Electronic Voting: Why Ohio’s Use of Different Methods to Count Ballots Violates 
the Equal Protection Clause – Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004), 
31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 527, 534–35 (2006). 
 137  See Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that voters 
using touchscreen DRE machines “prevent some of the voter errors that are characteristic of 
optical scan voting systems.”). 
 138  MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 200; see also infra note 141 (discussing modern 
distrust of voting machines). 
 139  ALBRIGHT, supra note 22, at 78 (“Early experience with the voting 
machine . . . developed well-defined objections in the minds of many voters.”). 
 140  Letter from John R. Phillippe, Jr., Chief Counsel, Republican National Committee to 
State Election Officials (Nov. 1, 2012), available at 
http://actnow.gop.com/uploads/Letter_re_Voting_Machine_Errors.pdf (requesting that state 
officials address alleged DRE vote flipping issues citing a variety of possible causes 
including “miscalibration and hyper-sensitivity of the machines.”). 
 141  Stephanie Philips, The Risks of Computerized Election Fraud: When Will Congress 
Rectify a 38-Year-Old Problem?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1123, 1141 (2006) (noting that “the 
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The digitization of elections has placed stress on state election transparency 
regimes. Two examples illustrate some of the complications that have arisen. 
During the 2006 race for U.S. Congress in Florida’s thirteenth district, Sarasota 
County’s iVotronic DRE machines lacked verified paper trails.142 When the 
machine spit out the vote totals, challenger Christine Jennings trailed incumbent 
Vern Buchanan by 369 votes (out of nearly a quarter million cast, a one-quarter 
of one percent margin). To complicate matters, voters oddly cast 18,000 
“undervotes” in the Jennings–Buchanan race (meaning no vote was recorded). 
The number of undervotes was far higher than in previous elections in that 
county.143 During early voting, several voters had reported “difficulties getting 
their choices for Congress to register on the electronic touchscreen voting 
machines.”144 What was the problem? Poor ballot design? Voters expressing 
dissatisfaction with both candidates by voting for neither? A machine glitch? 
The world will never know. 
The narrow margin of victory triggered a manual recount145 that, in the case 
of iVotronic DRE, amounted to nothing more than a printout listing the 
machines’ vote totals—not a recount but a reprint quipped one observer.146 
                                                                                                                       
software used to run DREs should be carefully scrutinized because ‘no independent proof 
can be provided to the voter that the choices have, in fact, been entered correctly’ and 
because ‘[t]here are no ballots that can be recounted as a check on system correctness.’”) 
(quoting ROY G. SALTMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, 
ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY IN COMPUTERIZED VOTE-TALLYING (1988)); Mark 
Clayton, Voting-Machine Glitches: How Bad Was It on Election Day Around the Country?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/2012/1107/Voting-machine-glitches-How-bad-
was-it-on-Election-Day-around-the-country, archived at http://perma.cc/F5UC-CTC4; Eric 
Shawn, Claims Increase of Machines Switching Votes in Ohio, Other Battlegrounds, FOX 
NEWS (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/02/claims-increasing-
switched-votes-in-ohio, archived at http://perma.cc/N4W3-AUSJ; Steve Watson, Reports of 
Voting Machine Problems, Vote Flipping Begin to Pour in, INFOWARS.COM (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www.infowars.com/reports-of-voting-machine-problems-vote-flipping-begin-to-pour-
in/, archived at http://perma.cc/YF7V-NSA8. One of the most famous examples of hacking 
into an online voting system occurred when a Michigan University student hacked a pilot 
Internet voting system during a test period in Washington, D.C., making the system play the 
Michigan fight song every time a vote was cast. See Mike DeBonis, Hacker Infiltration Ends 
D.C. Online Voting Trial, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2010, 2:14 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/2010/10/hacker_infiltration_ends_dc_on.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/J35F-DGJB. 
 142  Jessica Ring Amunson & Sam Hirsch, The Case of the Disappearing Votes: Lessons 
from the Jennings v. Buchanan Congressional Election Contest, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 397, 401 (2008). 
 143  In 2002 in the last mid-term election, Sarasota reported an undervote of 2.5%, in 
contrast to the Jennings–Buchanan undervote total of 13.9% on election day and 17.6% 
during early voting. Id. at 399. 
 144  Id. 
 145  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(1) (West 2014) (requiring recount for a margin of 
victory of 0.25% or less). 
 146  Id. 
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Unsurprisingly, vote totals remained unchanged, prompting observers to label 
the recount an “an exercise in futility.”147 With no way to determine the source 
of the mysteriously large undervote, Jennings pursued an ultimately 
unsuccessful suit in state court and in the U.S. House of Representatives (which 
holds jurisdiction for election contests in U.S. House races).148 Jennings sought 
access to the hardware, software, and source code of the Sarasota machines. In 
state court, Florida’s trade secret privilege thwarted Jennings’s discovery 
attempts.149 A Florida circuit court denied access, holding that the producer of 
the iVotronic’s trade secret protections outweighed Jennings’s right to access 
materials.150 Attempts at the federal level proved similarly fruitless in 
determining the actual cause of the undervote. A fifteen-month congressional 
process under the Federal Contested Elections Act151 did not include forensic 
review of the machines at issue, meaning the cause of the 18,000 undervotes 
will never been known.152  
A second example is Virginia’s statute governing recounts for DRE 
machines. Some counties in Virginia use optical scan voting machines; others 
use DREs. In a Virginia recount, optical scan paper ballots are recounted by 
hand. The recount statute provides for a process by which DRE ballots may be 
“redetermined” for recount purposes as follows: 
For direct recording electronic machines . . . the recount officials shall 
open the envelopes with the printouts and read the results from the printouts. If 
the printout is not clear, or on the request of the court, the recount officials 
shall rerun the printout from the machine or examine the counters as 
appropriate.153 
But the word “counter” is an anachronism. DREs do not contain counters in 
the way, for example, lever machines contained mechanical, analog counters. 
The entire DRE machine is, in a manner, a counter. Determining the cause of a 
glitch and possibly recovering votes in a Virginia recount involving DREs could 
result in as much uncertainty as Florida’s thirteenth district experienced in 
2006.154  
                                                                                                                       
 147  Jeremy Wallace, Call for Paper Trail, New Election, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE 
(Nov. 16, 2006, 3:23 AM), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20061116/NEWS/ 
611160464?p=2&tc=pg, archived at http://perma.cc/CVQ5-UZSS. 
 148  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members.”). 
 149  Order on Motions, Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm’n of the State of Fla., 
No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 5508540 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2006). 
 150  Id. 
 151  2 U.S.C. §§ 381–96 (2012).  
 152  H.R. REP. NO. 110-528 (2008). Florida subsequently switched to optical scan 
voting. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.56075 (West 2014). 
 153  VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-802 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 154  This scenario formed the basis of the May 16, 2012 Election Law Program Virginia 
War Game. See Virginia War Game, ELECTION LAW PROGRAM, 
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The Florida and Virginia examples illustrate that beyond problems of voter 
distrust of voting technology, outdated transparency statutes can exacerbate the 
problem and unnecessarily test the ability of election officials and the courts to 
resolve election transparency conflicts free of political taint. Furthermore, and 
almost as importantly, because electronic voting machines can remove the 
possibility of manual ballot counting, electronic voting has the collateral effect 
of focusing campaign and public oversight energy on other materials such as 
early, mail-in, and provisional voting materials. This collateral effect 
compounds transparency problems when state statutes inadequately address 
these forms of voting. 
C. Post-Bush v. Gore Oversight Norms 
The 2000 presidential election controversy ushered in a new era in election 
oversight. The drama that unfolded in Florida served as a wake up call to many 
Americans that our system of elections was broken and in need of attention. 
Since Bush v. Gore, this country has witnessed an explosion of interest in 
election oversight. Voting rights and voting integrity groups have proliferated, 
and individual citizens have become interested in monitoring elections—
particularly when elections are close.155 Election litigation has increased in 
frequency and the election law bar has expanded considerably.156 In addition, 
the post-Bush v. Gore oversight era coincided with a larger government 
transparency movement prompted by the rise of the Internet, a technology 
enabling government transparency and oversight on a scale and scope not 
previously imaginable. The promise of digital transparency changes the nature 
of access requests and the type and volume of data election administrators can, 
and do, release. It has also magnified the public’s transparency expectations.  
In the past, most election records never saw the light of day, in part because 
election records were highly decentralized and in paper form. Access requests 
were commonly denied due to heavy burdens on election administrators in 
compiling hard copy materials—often when time was short and offices 
understaffed.157 Before the 2002 Help American Vote Act, for example, states 
were not required to maintain centralized voter registries and few did. Local 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.electionlawissues.org/War-Games/Virginia.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/5VPK-4U8W. The war game consisted of Virginia election 
attorneys arguing the fully briefed fictional case before a three-judge panel. Id. 
 155  See, e.g., TRUE THE VOTE, https://www.truethevote.org/aboutus (last visited Aug. 18, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/59TL-EJFZ. True the Vote and dozens of voting integrity 
groups have formed in states across the country. See also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Tweets 
Alert Virginia Vote-Counters to Mistakes in Race, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:53 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-13/tweets-alert-virginia-vote-counters-to-
mistakes-in-race.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U47Q-JGBG. 
 156  Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 958–59 (2005) 
(documenting the dramatic rise in election litigation post Bush v. Gore). 
 157  See, e.g., Milton v. Hayes, 770 P.2d 14, 14 (Okla. 1989).  
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registrars maintained their own lists of voters, making any attempt to gather 
statewide election data extremely difficult. The problem of historically poor 
data on U.S. elections and election administration has been well documented.158  
Today, access requests for many types of election records can (at least in 
theory) be met by clicking a mouse, removing perhaps the greatest historic 
barrier to election transparency. Examples of Internet-enhanced election 
transparency abound. In one early instance, during the Franken recount in 2008, 
the Minneapolis Star Tribune broadcast a live stream on its website of votes 
being counted; in the first four days of counting, over 112,000 viewers watched 
the proceedings.159 The media also affirmatively posted disputed ballots online, 
allowing the public to weigh for themselves whether voter intent could be 
discerned.160 During the Scott Walker recall recount in 2012, Wisconsin’s 
Government Accountability Board (seen as a model for nonpartisan election 
administration)161 broadcast the recount over the Internet to instill public 
confidence that election officials were following the rules. In another example, 
for a trial period in 2008–2009, Humboldt County, California election officials 
scanned voted ballots and posted them online.162 State election administrators 
are also experimenting with Internet portals for voter information such as voter 
registration lists and information about mail and provisional ballot status.163 
                                                                                                                       
 158  GERKEN, supra note 15, at 4.  
 159  Marisa Helms, Political Junkies Flock to Live Streaming of Senate Recount 
Proceedings, MINNPOST (Dec. 22, 2008), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/12/ 
political-junkies-flock-live-streaming-senate-recount-proceedings, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NKH3-S5QZ. 
 160  See, e.g., Than Tibbets & Steve Mullis, Challenged Ballots: You Be the Judge, 
MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Dec. 3, 2008), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/features/ 
2008/11/19_challenged_ballots/, archived at http://perma.cc/M6F-VQB2 (posting disputed 
ballots online for public inspection during the Franken-Coleman recount). 
 161  Abby Rapoport, What? There’s a Nonpartisan Way to Run Elections!?, AM. 
PROSPECT (Sept. 24, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/what-theres-nonpartisan-way-run-
elections, archived at http://perma.cc/H3HL-P92B. 
 162  See HUMBOLDT COUNTY ELECTION TRANSPARENCY PROJECT,  
http://humtp.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9YXX-E59P; 
Adler & Hall, supra note 12, at 146. 
 163  For examples of web-based tools that allow voters to check the status of mail-in 
ballots, see Track Your Absentee Ballot, IOWA SEC’Y ST., 
http://sos.iowa.gov/elections/absenteeballotstatus/search.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9UT8-L44E; Vote By Mail, LA. SEC’Y STATE, 
http://www.sos.la.gov/ElectionsAndVoting/Vote/VoteByMail/ Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q8FX-FF52; Voter Lookup, MD. ST. BD. 
ELECTIONS, https://voterservices.elections.maryland.gov/VoterSearch# (last visited Oct. 22, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7CLZ-EKPB. Other states provide online portals that 
allow voters to check the status of their provisional ballots. See Provisional Search, N.C. ST. 
BD. ELECTIONS, https://www.ncsbe.gov/webapps/pvpinsearch/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/TS7W-F9CE; Provisional Ballot Search, W. VA. SEC’Y ST., 
https://apps.sos.wv.gov/elections/ voter/ provisional.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/PT63-ZKHE. Online campaign donation databases, such as the 
Federal Election Commission, provide tools that constitute another category of internet-
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While most such efforts are intended to help individual voters track their mail-
in or provisional ballot status, these online systems hold the technical potential 
to enable much broader public access to election records should states opt to 
open them up. 
As the two trends converge—more groups and individuals interested in 
overseeing election processes and greater capacity of election officials to serve 
up digitized election records—perhaps optimism is warranted. Have we come to 
a point when absolute election transparency can replace a state’s reliance on 
structured oversight? Maybe allowing access to traditional and nontraditional 
voting materials to traditional and nontraditional overseers marks the real future 
of election transparency. So far, however, most election officials have been 
wary to embrace this future.  
Colorado’s experience provides a window into some of the concerns. In 
2009, controversy arose in Colorado when Marilyn Marks, the losing candidate 
in the Aspen mayoral election, sued for access to digital copies of voted ballots 
cast in the election she lost.164 The clerk’s office had taken extraordinary steps 
to make digitized copies of voted ballots available for public inspection, briefly 
displaying each of the 2,544 ballots in digital form (as TIFF files)165 on large, 
public video monitors at the tabulation center.166 About a week after the 
election (and after the deadline had passed to contest the result) the clerk 
disclosed a discrepancy between the manual count of cast ballots and computer-
generated data.167 Marks immediately filed a Colorado Open Records Act 
(CORA) request for the full set of TIFF files.168 The clerk denied Marks’s 
request, citing ballot secrecy concerns and a Colorado statute requiring ballots 
be held for six months after elections and then destroyed.169 
Marks sued. After losing in district court, the appeals court reversed. The 
court of appeals held that granting Marks’s request would not compromise 
secrecy in voting and that copies of the ballots, which had already been publicly 
                                                                                                                       
aided election transparency, but fall outside the scope of this article. See, e.g., Disclosure 
Data Search, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ 
disclosure_data_search.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4BEZ-
V6M8?type=image. 
 164  TrueBallot, Inc., the company hired by the clerk’s office, created copies of the 
ballots as “part of a computerized ballot tabulation system designed for the new instant 
runoff voting (IRV) procedures of the City of Aspen.” Marks v. Koch, 284 P.3d 118, 120 
(Colo. App. 2011). 
 165  Tagged Image File Format. 
 166  The clerk even broadcasted selected TIFF files on local television encouraging 
public scrutiny. Marks, 284 P.3d at 120. 
 167  Id. 
 168  Teresa L. Benns, Colorado Appeals Court Decision Upholds Open Records Law, 
ALAMOSA VALLEY COURIER (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.alamosanews.com/v2_news_ 
articles.php?heading=0&story_id=22156&page=7, archived at http://perma.cc/QQ6T-K4B9. 
 169  Marks, 284 P.3d at 120–21. 
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disclosed, were not “ballots” under the election code and must therefore be 
released to Marks.170 
But the story did not end there. With an appeal to the Colorado Supreme 
Court pending, election officials successfully lobbied the legislature to pass 
legislation prohibiting county clerks from fulfilling a CORA request for voted 
ballots during a blackout period—forty-five days before election day until the 
election is certified.171 The legislation carves out an exception for “interested 
parties” such as candidates and parties who may access ballots during the 
blackout period. Critics of the legislation decried the creation of a “privileged 
class” of persons who could access the materials. Governor Hickenlooper 
signed the bill nevertheless in June 2012, and it remains on the books today.172 
As states struggle to adapt to increasing pressure for transparency of 
nontraditional voting materials from nontraditional oversight groups and amidst 
fast-changing technical realities, election transparency statutes often prove 
inadequate. Access disputes threaten the stability of outcomes, the neutrality of 
the judiciary, and the ability of election administrators to run elections 
smoothly. Transparency rules that fail to address changed circumstances 
weaken public confidence in electoral outcomes. The next section examines 
how policymakers might respond to these challenges and suggests possible 
paths forward.  
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD: REFORMING ELECTION TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency rules must adapt to changing circumstances. This section 
explores how in four parts. The first examines whether states should constrict 
who may access election materials, concluding that “structured oversight” is 
neither desirable nor possible. The second section surveys current thinking on 
the dangers of transparency and considers scholarship that aims to improve 
transparency regimes by taking these dangers into account. The third section 
suggests reforms that might curb the negative impacts of greater election 
transparency. And the final section presents a case study to test these theories. 
A. A Return to Structured Oversight? 
Some might argue the best way forward is to look back, returning to 
Progressive Era-styled structured oversight. The Colorado legislature’s choice 
to limit access to voted ballots to candidates and parties provides one example 
of a state choosing this direction. One could imagine states turning to this 
solution for other kinds of voting materials. States might decide that only 
                                                                                                                       
 170  Id. at 124 
 171  COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-205.5 (2014). 
 172  Editorial: A Step Back on Colorado Election Rules, DENVER POST (June 12, 2012, 
5:42 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_20834247/editorial-step-back-election-rules, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4989-KX82 (arguing that the creation of a privileged class of 
access is misguided). 
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candidates and their representatives can access provisional or mail-in voting 
lists, voter histories, poll book data, voter registration materials, and so forth. 
There are several reasons why this approach might be beneficial. First, much 
like the adversarial system in our judiciary, the parties will serve as vigilant 
proxies for the public. Parties and candidates have strong reasons to make sure 
that only eligible voters are registered, that election technology is functioning, 
that election day processes are carried out according to the rules, and that 
counting is fair, accurate, and honest.173  
Second, a party or candidate-led system of oversight is easier for election 
officials to administer. Rather than handling access requests from numerous 
(even multitudes of) requestors, limiting access to parties and candidates 
narrows the number of access requests to a manageable few. Restricting 
oversight access to parties and candidates enables election administrators to 
retain high levels of transparency without sacrificing dignity and decorum in the 
process. A free-for-all model of access risks exposing elections to morass, 
uncertainty, and delay. In addition, those few granted access are accountable, 
known actors. Restricting access to parties and candidates allows election 
administrators to impose standards on behavior and on the use of information 
released to protect election integrity and voter privacy—a growing concern in 
the age of Big Data.174  
While tempting, particularly for those who crave order in what feels like an 
increasingly chaotic electoral process, the drawbacks of structured oversight are 
many. A first issue is information asymmetry. As is often the case, if one 
campaign or party has better political information about the voting public or is 
more technologically sophisticated, access to election information can result in 
the voters of one party or candidate having an advantage over the other. A stark 
example of this is Minnesota’s Franken–Coleman recount in 2008. According to 
one observer, Franken’s attorneys far outmatched Coleman’s team in data 
sophistication. Franken’s attorneys had “computer geeks” sitting nearby as they 
figured out which mail-in ballots to challenge.175 Information asymmetries will 
likely decrease going forward as both parties are now actively engaged in 
                                                                                                                       
 173  We rely on adverse interested parties to act as proxies for the public interest in many 
settings. For example, we promote corporate competition through antitrust laws for the 
benefit of consumers. See generally Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012) (prohibiting 
activities that restrict competition in the marketplace). 
 174   See generally Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014). Some states are reacting to voter privacy concerns. Utah, for 
example, is considering legislation that would allow voters to request that their voter 
information be kept private. Lee Davidson, Bill to Keep Utah Voter Data Private Passes 
House, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/ 
57596888-90/bill-data-edwards-information.html.csp, archived at http://perma.cc/U2PU-
EKSU.  
 175  WEINER, supra note 84, at 133 (“More than once, voting officials and Coleman reps 
witnessed Franken lawyers check with staff members— ‘computer geeks’ . . . —who sorted 
through voter data information on their laptops. In a few cases, the staffer with the computer 
gave a thumbs-up or thumbs-down to the Franken lawyer, and a decision was made.”).  
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vigorous political data efforts.176 Yet in smaller races, in instances when 
national and state parties decide against devoting significant resources to data-
driven decision making—and for races involving less sophisticated third 
parties—information asymmetries will persist. Relatedly, the adversarial system 
can pit well-funded candidates against candidates who lack resources to 
undertake expensive oversight operations, which can require paid staff and 
hundreds of volunteers. Particularly in state and local level races (and races with 
poorly-funded third parties), resource asymmetries can translate to a breakdown 
in adversarial oversight.177  
A second problem with structured access is what can be termed “loser 
distortion.” Losing candidates and parties, far from seeking to ensure that 
elections are being run legitimately, have a huge incentive to demonstrate the 
exact opposite. The more doubt the losing candidate can cast on the propriety of 
an election process the better. Partisan oversight can fuel mutual distrust, can be 
wasteful, and can threaten election decorum. After all, partisans are not after the 
truth; they want to “get their guy in.” This phenomenon is well-documented.178 
Not allowing a wide range of observers, such as members of the press and 
public, access to confirm or disprove such allegations will exacerbate public 
distrust of electoral outcomes.179  
Finally, perhaps the most persuasive argument against structured oversight 
is that it may well be impossible to put the toothpaste back in the tube. Limiting 
access to only candidate and party representatives is increasingly unacceptable 
to advocacy groups, the media, and others interested in overseeing elections. 
Although restricting oversight access to political party and candidate 
representatives has been the norm for decades, the norm is fast unraveling as 
                                                                                                                       
 176  See, e.g., John Nichols, Not Just the NSA: Politicians Are Data Mining the American 
Electorate, NATION (June 11, 2013, 11:26 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/174759/not-
just-nsa-politicians-are-data-mining-american-electorate#, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
R3AP-DL9A (describing sophisticated data mining efforts by both the Republican and 
Democratic Parties); Rubinstein, supra note 174. 
 177  This phenomenon played out dramatically in the Cochran-McDaniel primary runoff 
in Mississippi discussed below. In the aftermath of that race, McDaniel, a Tea Party 
challenger to a six-term U.S. Senator, faced serious financial challenges when attempting to 
identify illegal crossover votes after the election. Sam R. Hall, Hall: McDaniel Campaign in 
Financial Straits, CLARION LEDGER (July 6, 2014, 3:03 PM), 
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/07/05/hall-mcdaniel-
campaign-financial-straits/12260883/, archived at http://perma.cc/74YG-D3U8. However, 
whether or not outside groups could assist the McDaniel campaign in post-election oversight 
became a litigated question. See infra Part IV.D. 
 178  See HASEN, supra note 3, at ix; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the 
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6 
(1996) (commenting on the adversarial system in the justice system, “polarized debate 
distorts the truth, leaves out important information, simplifies complexity, and obfuscates 
rather than clarifies.”) (footnotes omitted)). 
 179  Then again, outside groups may be just as dedicated to distorting the truth as 
political parties and campaigns—in some cases even more so. 
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technology enables ordered access and the open government movement gains 
steam.  
In the past, the government’s interest in confining access to a limited few 
was often compelling given the practical realities of the day. For example, when 
the information being sought must be acquired in person (e.g., viewing counting 
tables during ballot counting), allowing too many bodies in the room is 
unworkable. Concern about preserving original documents is another 
example.180 Technology increasingly renders these concerns moot.181 Cameras 
can be mounted and live feeds posted online to allow as many observers to 
watch ballot counts as are interested.182 Original materials can be copied and 
distributed digitally without harming original documents. 
Frustrated by structured transparency regimes when old justifications often 
no longer hold water, numerous individuals and groups have challenged 
structured oversight laws. The KnowCampaign v. Rodrigues provides an 
example.183 In that case, a nonprofit group sought access to voter history 
records.184 The Virginia statute allowed only candidates, elected officials, and 
political party chairmen access to voter history lists.185 The KnowCampaign 
brought suit claiming that the denial of access constituted a violation of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.186 The circuit court judge 
agreed, finding no compelling interest served by the government’s restriction of 
disclosure to political parties and candidates only.187 
Instead of seeing broad oversight by many different groups as a hindrance, 
perhaps we should welcome this trend. Understaffed and under-budgeted 
election offices (and underfunded local or third-party candidates) can arguably 
use the help. Knowing that various groups are fully engaged in oversight—for 
                                                                                                                       
 180  See, e.g., Kibort v. Westrom, 862 N.E.2d 609, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that 
interest in preserving unspoiled ballots outweighed access interest); State ex rel. Roussel v. 
St. John the Baptist Parish Sch. Bd., 135 So. 2d 665, 668 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (concerning 
the preservation of ballots). 
 181  The same can be said of allowing TV cameras in the courtroom, a practice that 
courts commonly refused to allow before cameras could be deployed without disruption. See 
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) (describing the disruption of TV cameras in the 
courtroom: “[c]ables and wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones 
were on the judge’s bench and others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table. It is 
conceded that the activities of the television crews and news photographers led to 
considerable disruption of the hearings.”). Once technology advanced such that cameras 
posed no threat of disruption, that argument fell. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 576 
(1981). 
 182  See Marks v. Koch, 284 P.3d 118, 120 (Colo. App. 2011). 
 183  See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of another example, True the Vote v. Hosemann, 
No. 34–CV–532–NFA, 2014 WL 4273332 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2014). 
 184  KnowCampaign v. Rodrigues, No. CL10-3425, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010). 
 185  VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-406(a) (2014). 
 186  Complaint at 7–8, KnowCampaign v. Rodrigues, No. CL10-3425 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
2010). 
 187  See KnowCampaign, No. CL10-3425, at 10. 
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example, through online crowdsourced vetting of voter lists,188 recount 
processes,189 or petition signature validity190—can provide a measure of 
comfort as election administrators struggle to do the best they can with limited 
resources.191 Broad public scrutiny of elections can also help local registrars 
identify and rectify problems in real time. We have seen perhaps no better 
example of this play out than David Wasserman’s tweeting effort during the 
canvass in the 2013 Virginia attorney general’s race.192 Wasserman, a Virginia 
political blogger, mounted a tweeting effort that consolidated on-the-ground 
reports from observers, citizens, and election officials. The media, the 
candidates, election officials, and the public at large scrutinized Wasserman’s 
Twitter feed. It became the go-to information source during the canvas. Many 
believe Wasserman’s efforts lead to the discovery of missed ballots and 
ultimately, some argue, a more accurate final count. Wasserman explained his 
surprise at Virginia election officials’ reaction to his tweeting: “I was expecting 
them to say, ‘Stop denigrating our electoral process.’ Instead they said, ‘I want 
to thank you for the public service you’re doing.’”193 Close, broad-based 
scrutiny may enhance efficient resolution of election irregularities. 
For the reasons above, permitting access to election materials to outside 
groups may have cost and efficiency benefits. The opposite, however, could 
equally be true. Too many eyes sifting through election material has the 
potential to increase costs to election administrators, decrease efficiency, or 
worse, damage public confidence in election outcomes. Making election 
information available too broadly can backfire if doing so gives rise to 
confusion, conspiracy theories, inaccurate portrayals or distortion of data, or 
threats to individual voting rights. This impulse has perpetuated structured 
oversight regimes.194  
                                                                                                                       
 188  Justin Levitt, The Danger of Voter Fraud Vigilantes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012, 
9:17 PM), http:// campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/the-danger-of-voter-fraud-
vigilantes/, archived at http://perma.cc/DM6J-FVG5. 
 189  Recall Election Information, WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., 
http://gab.wi.gov/elections-voting/recall, archived at http://perma.cc/W8U5-ZCQS (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 190  Rebecca Green, Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 367, 
382 (2013) (discussing privacy concerns associated with publication of petition signatories). 
 191  The obvious counterargument here is that when outside groups vet voter lists, they 
cause more work, not less, for election workers and often falsely challenge voters. See 
Levitt, supra note 188 (describing mass public challenges to voter eligibility by “amateur 
sleuths” being, in the end, “predictably replete with error” and resulting in few legitimate 
challenges). 
 192  Davis, supra note 155. 
 193  Id. 
 194  See Susan Ferguson Chance & Colleen Connolly-Ahern, A Vote of Confidence? 
Florida’s Public Records Law and the 2000 Presidential Election Recounts: Could It 
Happen in Any Other State?, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 139 (2001). 
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B. Against Transparency? 
A version of this impulse prompts some to conclude that government 
transparency has a dark side, giving rise a growing sense that the drive to put 
any and all government data online could undermine the very confidence in 
government it is meant to inspire.195  Some voice concern that “[w]e are not 
thinking critically enough about where and when transparency works, and 
where and when it may lead to confusion, or to worse.”196 Especially when 
government data contains inaccuracies, when it is not contextualized, and when 
data users fail to take the time reach accurate conclusions, broad data disclosure 
threatens to do more harm than good.197  
Building on important work sorting through effective and ineffective 
transparency regimes,198 one way to think about transparency in election 
administration is to start by making a distinction between transparency that 
helps election administrators and legislators improve election processes 
(management transparency) and transparency measures that enable observers to 
verify voter eligibility and election outcomes (outcome transparency). While the 
line between the two is admittedly fuzzy, management transparency in elections 
would consist of election data that afford both the public and election officials 
the ability to evaluate election processes and their successes and shortcomings 
before, during, and after elections. Much thoughtful work has been done on 
improving management transparency in elections. In Evaluating Elections, R. 
Michael Alvarez, Lonna Rae Atkenson, and Thad V. Hall argue convincingly 
for increased performance-based evaluation of election administration.199 They 
believe that the success of election administration can and should be measured 
to improve election efficiency and public confidence in outcomes. The authors 
argue that states should cull data before, during, and after elections that helps 
evaluate topics such as:  
• “How many people were turned away from the polls or voted 
provisionally? . . .  
                                                                                                                       
 195  See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE 
PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 177–80 (2007) (describing the real risks broad 
disclosure can engender); Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 
2009), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/against-transparency, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GW8B-W59X. 
 196  See Lessig, supra note 195. 
 197  Id. Some have raised concerns about too much transparency in the campaign finance 
realm as well. See Hasen, supra note 14, at 558–59. These same concerns, interestingly, 
have prompted U.S. Supreme Court justices to refuse to allow cameras to record oral 
argument at the Court. Exclaimed Justice Souter, “I can tell you the day you see a camera 
come into our courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead body.” On Cameras in Supreme 
Court, Souter Says, ‘Over My Dead Body,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/30/us/on-cameras-in-supreme-court-souter-says-over-my-
dead-body.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ECV6-NR99. 
 198  FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 195, at 6. 
 199  ALVAREZ, ATKESON & HALL, supra note 15, at 1–9. 
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• Did the poll workers report problems in the election? . . .  
• Did the machines count votes correctly? 
• What was the roll-off on down ballot races?”200 
According to Alvarez, Atkenson, and Hall, answers to questions such as 
these will help election administrators improve elections and will help the 
public evaluate how well (or poorly) elections are run.201  
Others have called for increased management transparency in elections. 
One early thought leader is Heather Gerken at Yale. Gerken argued in her 2009 
book The Democracy Index that more election data would lead to better-run 
elections.202 Gerken suggested that election data could spur state rankings on 
various aspects of election performance, exposing what works and what does 
not.203 Data-based rankings would then push state election administrators to try 
and “keep up with the Joneses,” improving overall election management 
countrywide.204  
Pew’s Election Performance Index, released in 2013, makes Gerken’s idea a 
reality.205 The index uses management data to measure election performance 
according to seventeen measurable indicators such as polling place wait times 
and ballot rejection rates. 206 To create it, Pew collected data from a variety of 
sources, including: the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey Voting 
and Registration Supplement, Election Assistance Commission surveys, and 
other surveys and studies.207 The result is impressive—amounting to a thorough 
numbers-based evaluation of state election ecosystems. 
Increased management transparency in elections offers promise even 
beyond Gerken’s vision. Election management data accessible in machine-
readable format could allow developers to create a variety of applications that 
assist the smooth functioning of elections from voter registration interfaces to 
voting efficiency to improvements in voter education on substantive election 
questions.208 Examples of the power of open data in elections are apps that 
                                                                                                                       
 200  Id. at 3. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but rather offered as examples of the 
kinds of data and information that should be transparent in a management transparency 
model. 
 201  Id. 
 202  GERKEN, supra note 15, at 5–6.  
 203  Id.  
 204  Id. at 6 (“A ranking should work for the simplest of reasons: no one wants to be at 
the bottom of the list.”).  
 205  Elections Performance Index, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/0001/01/01/elections-
performance-index, archived at http://perma.cc/GD8R-4HEJ. 
 206  Heather Gerken, Gerken: Pew’s Election Performance Index, ELECTION LAW BLOG 
(Feb. 10, 2013, 9:05 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=47114, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8DR9-A8RW. 
 207  See Elections Performance Index, supra note 205. 
 208  See Harlan Yu & David G. Robinson, The New Ambiguity of “Open 
Government,” 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 178, 180 (2012), available at
http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/59-11.pdf. 
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assist voters in locating their polling place, determine levels of local polling 
place congestion on election day, and help voters learn about ballot initiatives 
and candidates (lessening time spent in the voting booth and thus shortening 
wait times on election day).209  
C. Addressing Outcome Transparency 
If management transparency in elections furthers the goal of increasing 
election efficiency and improving election processes, what does election 
outcome transparency look like, what are its dangers, and how can election 
officials temper its negative effects? Outcome transparency can be thought of as 
any oversight action aimed at verifying the accuracy of an election outcome. 
This can range from efforts to verify that individual voters are U.S. citizens or 
that a single voter has not cast ballots in multiple states. Outcome transparency 
would also encompass efforts on election day to oversee the voting process to 
make sure election officials do not turn away eligible voters. Outcome 
transparency would also include efforts after votes are cast to audit machines or 
examine absentee ballots or lists of provisional voters to ensure no ineligible 
votes are counted. Outcome transparency trains its sights on ensuring that only 
eligible voters voted, that the system did not prevent eligible voters from casting 
ballots, and that all legal ballots were included in the count.  
What are the dangers of outcome transparency? Professor Justin Levitt of 
Loyola Law School supplied an example on the eve of the 2012 election. Levitt 
called attention to mass-challenge efforts by amateur “voting integrity sleuths” 
scouring state voter registration databases to unearth illegal registrants.210 Levitt 
documents, however, that such challenges very often jeopardize the rights of 
legally registered voters.211 Sleuths based their challenges on mismatches 
between voter registration information and information in other public 
                                                                                                                       
 209  Seth Cline, Top 10 Smartphone Apps for the 2012 Campaign, US NEWS (Aug. 9, 
2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/08/09/top-10-smartphone-
apps-for-the-2012-campaign, archived at http://perma.cc/TK9V-VLYP (listing the top ten 
election apps for 2012 for following campaigns, tracking state legislatures, and reviewing 
polling data); Johanna Ambrosio, Tracy Mayor, Barbara Krasnoff & Valerie Potter, Election 
Fever: 6 Mobile Apps That Can Keep You Informed, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 10, 2012, 6:45 
AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9224069/Election_fever_6_mobile_apps_ 
that_can_keep_you_informed, archived at http://perma.cc/W8LD-XU7V (providing 
information on the candidates, campaigns, and news coverage); Gary Scharrer, Voters Urged 
to ‘Make Your Mark on Texas,’ HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://blog.chron.com/texaspolitics/ 2012/04/voters-urged-to-make-your-mark-on-texas/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4E4Y-4TVU (discussing the still live VoteTexas app which 
provides information like when, where, and how to vote); Voting and Elections, CABARRUS 
COUNTY, http://www.cabarruscounty.us/resident/Pages/Elections.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/795Q-HCLR (providing an app that shows map of 
election polling places). 
 210  Levitt, supra note 188. 
 211  Id.  
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documents (for example inconsistencies in address information).212 Levitt 
cautioned that amateur sleuths might unwittingly do more harm than good.213 
Time and again in the election context, allegations of fraud and illegally 
registered voters turn out “false positives,” fuel misinformation and 
misperception, and waste state resources.214 Seen in this light, outcome 
transparency in elections is transparency that enables members of the public to 
expose fraud, disqualify voters, or otherwise discredit elections without 
sufficient evidence. Outcome transparency in elections can be harmful because 
it empowers users of data—who may take the data out of context, purposefully 
distort the data, or otherwise misinterpret data—to threaten the rights of eligible 
voters, the legitimacy of elected candidates, and the public’s confidence in 
elections generally.  
It does not follow, however, that just because election records can be 
misused or create confusion they should therefore be hidden from public view. 
One problem is the practical difficultly of disaggregating management data 
from outcome data, allowing public access to one but not the other. Another is 
that in many instances state and federal law mandate public access to records 
that can be used for outcome-challenging purposes.215 Instead of denying access 
or resorting to structured oversight policies, perhaps a more targeted approach is 
advised.  
In their 2007 book, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of 
Transparency, Archon Fung, Mary Graham and David Weil surveyed 
transparency policies in a wide range of government and private settings. They 
concluded that the common wisdom that more transparency is always better is 
shortsighted and in many cases wrong. Instead the authors argue that 
policymakers should engage in what they term “targeted transparency,” 
thoughtful disclosure aimed at serving specific policy goals.216 The authors call 
for careful design of transparency interfaces to ensure that users can 
                                                                                                                       
 212  Id.  
 213  Id.  In one of Levitt’s examples, amateur sleuths challenged a registrant based on a 
missing comma. Id.  
 214  JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD 4 
(2007), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20
Voter%20Fraud.pdf (discussing instances of alleged voter fraud and the paltry number of 
proven cases); David Schultz, Less than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the 
Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 496 
(2008). 
 215  E.g., National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i) (2012) (“Each State 
shall maintain for at least 2 years and shall make available for public inspection and, where 
available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the implementation of 
programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of 
official lists of eligible voters, except to the extent that such records relate to a declination to 
register to vote or to the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular 
voter is registered.”). In another example, as noted above, many state laws require public 
access to lists of voters requesting and casting early and mail-in ballots. See supra note 92. 
 216  FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 195, at 6. 
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comprehend and compare information and put data in context. The authors also 
argue for mechanisms to ensure that the data are accurate, that data subjects can 
correct data about them, and that the data source incorporates mechanisms for 
data analysis and user feedback.217 
Fung, Graham and Weil’s conclusions do not map perfectly onto the 
election transparency landscape. The systems they studied largely focused on 
transparency aimed at improving individual decision making—which products 
to buy (consumer transparency), which hospitals to seek care from (patient 
safety information), who to vote for (campaign finance disclosure), and so forth. 
The main goal of election administration transparency is not to enable improved 
citizen decision making but, as established above, to ensure that citizens have 
faith in electoral outcomes. Still, although the goals are different, the idea of 
targeting transparency does helpful work.  
Using targeted transparency ideas as a basis, several specific policy 
recommendations to increase the benefits of management transparency and 
lessen the negative impacts of outcome transparency come into focus. First, 
states should strive to improve their election information architectures. Fung, 
Graham, and Weil advise that transparency works best when the entity 
disclosing data provides information that is easy for ordinary citizens to use and 
understand.218 To that end, election administrators should take steps that range 
from improving database design and election data user interfaces to enabling 
registered voters to easily update and correct their own voter information. Some 
states are already doing important work improving voter interfaces with election 
data. Colorado, for example, just released a new website called ACE 
(Accountability in Colorado Elections).219 The site sorts election administration 
data by county into a series of interactive maps, charts, and tables. While this 
data has long been publicly available, it was practically inaccessible. Anyone 
who wanted to access this information before would have had to visit dozens of 
websites and election offices to collect it.220 Other states have invested in 
improving quality and accuracy by creating online portals that allow voters to 
register online, correct voter registration information, and determine the status 
of ballots cast.221  
                                                                                                                       
 217  Id. at 177–80. 
 218  FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 195, at 8 (describing public disclosure of 
drinking water safety data that was overly-technical, inaccurate, and out-of-date). The result 
was public confusion and increased health risks for consumers who relied on the data 
released. Id.  
 219 ACCOUNTABILITY COLO. ELECTIONS, http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/ 
ACE/home.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/43XA-U38P.  
 220  Doug Chapin, Colorado Opens Its Books to the People and Data Geeks, 
ELECTIONLINEWEEKLY (Aug. 8, 2014), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2014/ 
08/electionlineweekly_colorado_op.php. 
 221  See supra note 163. According to a recent survey, twenty states currently offer 
online registration and another four states have passed legislation to create online voter 
registration interfaces. Some online registration systems provide mechanisms for registered 
voters to correct voter registration information. See Online Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. 
2014] RETHINKING TRANSPARENCY 821 
 
Second, states should ensure that when the eligibility of registered voters is 
challenged—whether by amateur sleuths, through the state’s own efforts to 
cleanse its list, or in a post-election context where mail-in or provisional votes 
are questioned—voters should receive adequate notice in ample time to rectify 
problems. The National Voter Registration Act provides a model, requiring that 
before a state may remove a voter from its voter database, the state must mail a 
notice to the voter informing the voter how to update his or her voter 
registration and advising the voter how to proceed upon change of address.222 
HAVA provides a further example in the case of provisional ballots. After a 
voter casts a provisional ballot, HAVA requires that states provide a 
mechanism, such as a website or a toll-free hotline that allows the provisional 
voter an opportunity to confirm that her vote counted.223 
And third, rather than denying public access to voting materials altogether 
or relying on structured access policies, states should open their new-and-
improved books to all comers. Improved data interfaces and redaction mitigates 
the risk of wide-open access. But relying on improved election data should not 
be the end of the story. States should impose consequences for misuse of 
election information. Frivolous challenges to voter eligibility should result in 
sanctions, and subsequent denial of access to election materials for actors with a 
history of misuse of data. The idea of imposing penalties to discourage bad 
behavior and encourage good behavior is a model used in numerous contexts. 
Rule 11(b) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, discourages 
frivolous lawsuits by imposing costs on parties bringing them forward.224 Under 
Rule 11(b), those filing suit in federal court certify that, inter alia, to the best of 
their knowledge the suit is not being filed for an improper purpose and that the 
factual contentions have evidentiary support.225 Sanctions are levied against 
                                                                                                                       
ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/electronic-or-online-voter-registration.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/B2W5-
4ERA?type=image (noting that in New Mexico and Ohio voters can update an existing voter 
registration online). 
 222  42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(d)(2) (2012). 
 223  42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)(5)(B) (2012).  
 224  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 225  Id. (“By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an 
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is 
not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after 
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual 
contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably 
based on belief or a lack of information.”). 
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those filing improper or frivolous suits.226 Why not impose a version of Rule 
11(b) to combat the negative impacts of outcome transparency? Rather than fret 
about whether releasing election materials to outside groups will threaten 
eligible voters’ legitimate voting rights or result in bad faith efforts to 
undermine public faith in election outcomes, put the burden on the group using 
the data to use it responsibly.227  
The idea of punishing individuals and groups for interfering with the right 
to vote or undermining elections is not a new one. Several states have rules on 
the books that punish anyone who knowingly challenges a person’s right to vote 
on fraudulent or spurious grounds—often levying criminal sanctions for such 
action.228 The innovation here is: (1) tying increased access to improved 
election data to sanctions for its misuse, and (2) broadening the sanction not just 
for interference with the right to vote, but also for harms like violating voter 
privacy and misrepresenting data to undermine the legitimacy of election 
outcomes. 
Applying these ideas to a real-world case study, the 2014 Mississippi 
Republican primary runoff provides interesting fodder these suggestions. 
D. Case Study: True the Vote v. Hosemann 
In the lead up to the June 2014 Republican primary runoff election for Thad 
Cochran’s U.S. Senate seat in Mississippi, Tea Party challenger Chris McDaniel 
                                                                                                                       
 226  The Driver Privacy Protection Act provides another example of a statute that 
includes a penalty for misuse of government data. The Act provides that “[a] person who 
knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a 
purpose not permitted [by this statute] shall be liable to the individual to whom the 
information pertains.” Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) (2012).  
 227  If states are concerned that those requesting access will leave the state or otherwise 
fail to pay fines, states could adopt a model similar to criminal bonds whereby those 
requesting access must post an “Access Bond” the state will retain for a specific period until 
it can be assured that the requestor did not misuse the information.  
 228  E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18543(a) (West 2014) (“Every person who knowingly 
challenges a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent or spurious 
grounds, or who engages in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters 
solely for the purpose of preventing voters from voting or to delay the process of voting, or 
who fraudulently advises any person that he or she is not eligible to vote or is not registered 
to vote when in fact that person is eligible or is registered . . . is punishable by imprisonment 
in the county jail for not more than 12 months or in the state prison.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 204C.035(1) (West 2009) (“No person shall knowingly deceive another person regarding 
the time, place, or manner of conducting an election or the qualifications for or restrictions 
on voter eligibility for an election, with the intent to prevent the individual from voting in 
the election. A violation of this section is a gross misdemeanor.”). Some state statutes 
prohibit false challenges to voter eligibility without explicit criminal sanction. E.g., CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-232(b) (West 2014) (“Challenges shall not be made indiscriminately 
and may only be made if the challenger knows, suspects or reasonably believes such a 
person not to be qualified and entitled to vote. Any challenge by an elector and the statement 
of the person challenged shall be under oath, administered by the moderator.”). 
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seemed poised to beat the six-term senator.229 On the heels of Eric Cantor’s 
historic loss to a virtually unknown Tea Party challenger in Virginia a few 
weeks before, Cochran had every reason to worry.230 In an effort to keep his 
seat, Senator Cochran adopted a controversial strategy—wooing Democratic 
voters to cast ballots on his behalf in the Republican primary.231 When the 
counting was complete, Senator Cochran had pulled out a win by over 6,700 
votes, a lead many attributed to crossover Democratic voters.232 Infuriated by 
the tactic, McDaniel refused to concede, vowing to scour the rolls in search of 
illegal votes.233  
Mississippi law allows crossover voting, but does not allow voters to cast 
ballots in both party primaries. 234 Ballots cast by voters in the Republican 
primary who had already cast ballots in the earlier Democratic primary would 
                                                                                                                       
 229  See Curtis Wilkie, The Last Southern Gentleman, POLITICO (June 24, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-last-gentleman-
108228_Page2.html#.U_9LTVYf-lI, archived at http://perma.cc/5YK5-64X8 (“So this year, 
Thad is left with a following that is loving and loyal, but he is confronted with an opposition 
that is passionate. His friends are not optimistic.”). 
 230  John Harwood, How Thad Cochran Is Trying to Avoid Eric Cantor’s Fate, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/upshot/how-thad-cochran-is-
trying-to-avoid-eric-cantors-fate.html?abt=0002&abg=0, archived at http://perma.cc/PF9Q-
JNYV (“That strategy needs to work for Mr. Cochran to avoid the fate of Eric 
Cantor. . . . History suggests a vast majority of people won’t bother to vote for this sort of 
intraparty contest—no matter how much attention it gets. . . .”). 
 231  See Josh Kraushaar, Cochran’s Secret Weapon: Democratic Voters, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL (June 24, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/cochran-s-secret-
weapon-democratic-voters-20140624, archived at http://perma.cc/BGH-8J74. 
 232  2014 Republican Primary Run off Results, MISS. SEC’Y STATE (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Results-2014-republican-Primary-Run-
Off.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/9A9A-6NWB. 
 233  See Geoff Pender, Deborah Barfield Berry & Dustin Barnes, Cochran Wins Runoff; 
McDaniel Refuses to Concede, Plans Challenge, CLARION-LEDGER (June 25, 2014, 7:00 
AM), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/politics/2014/06/24/cochran-defeats-
mcdaniel/11341509/, archived at http://perma.cc/HK2C-EL8V. 
 234  Mississippi law prohibits voters from casting ballots in primaries for candidates they 
did not intend to vote for in the general election. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-575 (West 
2012) (“No person shall be eligible to participate in any primary election unless he intends to 
support the nominations made in the primary in which he participates.”). Several 
commentators opined that McDaniel would have a tough time disqualifying votes under the 
statute because he would have to find Democratic voters willing to go on record on 
McDaniel’s behalf stating that they violated Mississippi law. E.g., Rick Hasen, What’s Next 
for McDaniel After Apparent Loss But No Concession in #MSSEN Race? The Courts?, 
ELECTION LAW BLOG (June 24, 2014, 9:15 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=62735, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6QE3-JANA. Another perhaps more viable avenue was to 
disqualify voters by proving they had cast ballots in the Democratic primary two weeks 
earlier. See Alexandra Jaffe, The Defiant Mississippi Loser, THE HILL (July 1, 2014, 6:20 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/senate-races/211127-the-defiant-mississippi-loser, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XU5P-8PVN. 
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be disqualified. Under Mississippi’s structured oversight regime,235 McDaniel 
sent representatives to pore over election records throughout Mississippi to 
determine whether enough double votes had been cast to warrant filing a 
contest. Cochran likewise launched his own investigation to defend his lead. 
Mississippi’s election code is vague with respect to who may access 
election materials and when. While Mississippi’s statute clearly confines 
inspection of cast ballots to candidates and their representatives,236 it makes no 
specific mention of access to other kinds of election materials. Mississippi’s 
public records statute, however, is quite broad, proclaiming that all public 
records are “public property” that any person should have the right to inspect.237  
This lack of clear statutory command created confusion when the Texas-
based conservative voter integrity group True the Vote (TTV) sought access to 
election records in an effort to see for itself whether election irregularities had 
occurred. When TTV representatives sought access to election materials at 
county election clerks’ offices, they were met with mixed results.  Some 
counties denied TTV access altogether.238 Others permitted access to certain 
information, but insisted that TTV pay for nonpublic voter information to be 
redacted, citing Mississippi open records laws protecting personal information 
of Mississippi citizens.239  
In its complaint before the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of 
Mississippi, TTV claimed its right to access poll books, voter registration 
applications, absentee voting envelopes, absentee ballot applications, voter rolls 
and other documents had been violated.240 TTV asserted that the National Voter 
Registration Act (NVRA) required access because it mandates that states make 
available for public inspection “all records concerning the implementation of 
programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and 
currency of official lists of eligible voters.”241 TTV claimed that the NVRA 
thus required the state to grant TTV access to a range of election materials—not 
just voter registration materials—on the theory that those materials are all 
“records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted 
                                                                                                                       
 235  MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-575(1) (West 2012). 
 236  MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-271(1) (West 2012) (“The state executive committee of 
any political party authorized to conduct political party primaries shall form an election 
integrity assurance committee for each congressional district.”). 
 237  MISS. CODE. ANN. § 25-61-5 (West 2013) (“[A]ll public records are hereby declared 
to be public property, and any person shall have the right to inspect, copy or mechanically 
reproduce or obtain a reproduction of any public record of a public body in accordance with 
reasonable written procedures. . . .”). 
 238  Complaint ¶¶ 35–38, True the Vote v. Hosemann, No. 3:14CV532 HTW-LRA  
(S.D. Miss. July 9, 2014). 
 239  MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-5(2) (West 2013) (“public agency shall be entitled to 
charge a reasonable fee for the redaction of any exempted material, not to exceed the 
agency’s actual cost.”). 
 240  Complaint ¶ 16, True the Vote v. Hosemann, No. 3:14CV532HTW-LRA. 
 241  42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i) (2012). 
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for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible 
voters.”242 The state pushed back, citing its own data privacy rules.243 
True the Vote did not emerge victorious on its claims.244 Setting aside the 
merits, as a policy matter, are we happier leaving oversight of Mississippi’s 
exceptional election to the candidates to duke it out? Should structured 
transparency run its course? Does it matter that one candidate, as a sitting U.S. 
senator, has a resource advantage over a relatively unknown third-party 
candidate? Or, should Mississippi’s statutes be rewritten to allow outside groups 
like TTV access too? For reasons stated in Part IV.A above, clinging to 
structured oversight is a losing proposition if the goal is to promote confidence 
in election outcomes. Restricting access to parties and candidates—especially 
when the race involved a third party and allegations of irregularities and 
tampering swarmed—severely undermines public confidence in the integrity of 
Cochran’s win and feeds conspiracy theories about the political motivations of 
election officials and judges. Restricting access to election materials leaves 
many Mississippi voters to doubt the legitimacy of their elected representative, 
and may dampen Mississippi voters’ future enthusiasm to participate in 
elections. Shutting outside groups out of the process provokes distrust; if 
ensuring the election’s legitimacy is Mississippi’s goal, the state should have 
made the full panoply of election records available to anyone and everyone 
interested in taking a look. 
But the recommendation cannot end there. Mississippi election officials can 
take numerous steps to stave off the negative impacts of outcome transparency 
in the future. First, Mississippi should ensure that its outcome transparency 
rules anticipate access requests for different kinds of election records by a full 
range of actors. Regardless of whether the state decides to continue its 
structured access regime or if it decides to open its election records more 
broadly (or chooses different approaches for different kinds of records at 
different stages in the election process), Mississippi’s transparency statutes 
should include transparency rules for materials associated with new forms of 
voting and digitized election records, and they should make clear who can 
                                                                                                                       
 242  Id.  
 243  Mississippi law provides that “[s]ocial security numbers, telephone numbers and 
date of birth and age information in statewide, district, county and municipal 
voter  registration files . . . shall not be subject to inspection, examination, copying or 
reproduction. . . .” MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-165(6)(a) (West 2014). Mississippi’s Open 
Records Act requires parties inspecting records to bear the cost of redacting “exempted,” 
identifying information from voter rolls. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-5(2) (West 2013) 
(“[P]ublic agency shall be entitled to charge a reasonable fee for the redaction of any 
exempted material, not to exceed the agency’s actual cost.”). 
 244  On August 29, 2014, Judge Nancy Atlas denied TTV’s motion for a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction, rejecting the claim that the NVRA disclosure 
provisions encompass the range of materials TTV sought. True The Vote v. Hosemann, No. 
3:14–CV–00532–NFA, 2014 WL 4273332, at *31 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2014). The 
Republican Party sought Rule 11 sanctions against TTV to reimburse its attorney’s fees, a 
request the court denied. As of this writing, the ruling has not been appealed. 
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access what and when. Second, and relatedly, is the urgency of establishing 
clear transparency rules before the fact, well before elections take place. Clear 
rules in effect well before election day would have gone far to instill public 
confidence that partisan motives did not taint access decisions.  
Third, Mississippi should make improvements to its information 
architecture that make voting materials easy to access and easy to understand. 
On this front Mississippi has a lot of work to do. Others have already called 
attention to the poor state of Mississippi’s election data. Pew’s Election 
Performance Index, for example, rated Mississippi’s election data quality as the 
second lowest in the country.245 What if Mississippi election administrators had 
created a voter information system that indicated, in a centralized and publicly 
accessible online database, which voters had voted in which primaries?246 
Anyone could sign on to see whether double voting took place or challenge 
voters’ eligibility to vote for other valid reasons. Mississippi’s online database 
might also contain a notice mechanism, whereby a voter whose registration or 
ballot (including mail-in or provisional ballot) is challenged would receive 
automatic notice and be afforded an opportunity to correct any errors through an 
easy-to-use website interface or in person at a clerk’s office.  Mississippi might 
also consider baking into its voter records management system voter privacy 
protections by, for example, creating a mechanism that automatically redacts 
certain personal information before records are released. 
Aside from making changes and improvements to its information 
architecture, the state could combat misuse by implementing a Rule 11(b)-like 
sanctions regime for misuse of election data.247 With increased access to 
election materials should come increased responsibility. Those who misuse state 
voter records by filing frivolous challenges, harassing voters, violating voter 
privacy, or otherwise misusing or misrepresenting election data to maliciously 
or fraudulently foment distrust in election outcomes should be fined. Proceeds 
from Mississippi’s election data misuse fee could go to the state to recoup costs 
to taxpayers the misguided claim engendered, to citizens whose votes were 
                                                                                                                       
 245  Mississippi Elections Performance Index, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/04/07/2012_election_performance_index_mi
ssissippi.pdf?la=en, archived at http://perma.cc/E4MN-C9YR (“In 2012, the state had the 
second-lowest data completeness rate, 72.1%, and was one of only 10 states in which the 
rate decreased compared with 2008. The lack of data prevented calculation of Mississippi’s 
performance in most areas in the index.”).  
 246  Presumably such a database might even have assisted election officials during the 
election by preventing individuals who had cast ballots in the Democratic primary from 
voting in the Republican primary two weeks later. 
 247  Mississippi does not currently impose sanctions for misuse of election data or 
fraudulent or spurious challenges to the eligibility of voters. Indeed, some provisions of 
Mississippi’s election code absolve challenges to voter eligibility. E.g., MISS. CODE. ANN. 
§ 23-15-17 (West 2012) (“Any person who so notifies an authorized law enforcement officer 
[of a false registration] shall be presumed to be acting in good faith and shall be immune 
from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed.”). 
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imperiled, to recoup costs associated with defending voters’ eligibility, or to 
state election offices to further improve election data usability and access. 
A Mississippi election data misuse penalty would not come without cost. If 
we believe that individuals and outside groups should be encouraged to engage 
in oversight—particularly in a climate in which investigative journalism 
budgets are shot248—and we are convinced that more, not less, oversight would 
improve the legitimacy of our elections, imposing fees for misuse might deter 
would-be overseers. Even the specter of the cost of defending against 
allegations of misuse might prevent well-intentioned overseers from engaging 
in important oversight work. Although these concerns are valid, the solution is 
not to scrap the idea altogether. Instead Mississippi could calibrate its data 
misuse penalties to ensure that they are high enough to do the job but low 
enough that they will not squelch oversight efforts. In addition, concerns about 
deterrence are minimized since penalties would only be imposed for misuse of 
data, not for access. 
This recommended set of policies has numerous advantages for Mississippi 
and, of course, other states as well. First and foremost, a policy that allows full 
and open access to voting information enhances public confidence in 
Mississippi’s elections. As more and more voting takes place outside of polling 
places (mail-in voting was “brisk” in the Cochran-McDaniel primary),249 
increased transparency will serve to satisfy the public of the propriety of 
election processes. Voter integrity groups, journalists, and anyone else with the 
time and resources to examine voting materials for problems receives full 
access to comprehensible election records. Second, these reforms enhance 
oversight because they require election officials to make the data more easily 
comprehensible, usable, and available. Third, these policies would encourage 
users of Mississippi election data to act responsibly and refrain from levying 
hasty or poorly-researched accusations. Mississippi would achieve protection 
against the effects of loser distortion—only claims backed by credible evidence 
would move forward. And finally, these reforms would afford Mississippi 
voters a measure of comfort in knowing that their lawful voting status would 
not be frivolously challenged or their right of privacy abridged.  
The above suggestions acknowledge the danger of too much transparency in 
the election context. But they also harness the promise of technology and 
increased interest in election oversight to heal wounded public confidence in 
election outcomes. Adapting election transparency to changed circumstances 
requires creative approaches that encourage broad oversight of elections and 
limits the harms of too much transparency.  
                                                                                                                       
 248  See Lessig, supra note 195 (noting that “[l]ess than 10 percent of large daily 
newspapers in America have four investigative journalists or more” and that “40 percent 
have no investigative journalists at all.”). 
 249  Emily Wagster Pettus, Absentee Voting Brisk in Several Miss. Counties, CLARION-
LEDGER (June 22, 2014, 9:27 PM), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2014/06/ 
22/absentee-voting-brisk-several-miss-counties/11249801/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P376-D5H3. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is the responsibility of government to react to changed circumstances. 
Election transparency rules in this country are based on dated assumptions and 
significantly changed realities concerning how Americans vote, how modern 
information architecture operates, and how election oversight is conducted. 
Responding to these challenges, state election transparency statutes must set 
clear, predetermined rules for election oversight. When rules that govern 
elections are vague, outdated, or nonexistent the integrity of our election system 
is most in peril. Furthermore, states must recognize that efforts to limit access to 
election materials disserve transparency’s primary goal of legitimizing election 
outcomes. Policy makers must understand that they are not constrained to a 
light switch approach to transparency—either all on or all off. User interfaces 
both for voters and for overseers can be improved to prevent data errors and 
misuse, to better contextualize information, and to protect voter privacy. And 
finally, carefully calibrated deterrence measures can be implemented to ensure 
that the negative impacts of election transparency are minimized. In the end, 
taking the time to address transparency in elections and adapt policies to 
changed circumstances will improve not only the legitimacy of our elections but 
the quality of our democracy. 
 
